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Payment Law: Legislative Competence in Canada
Benjamin Geva*
This article addresses the legislative competence in Canada in relation to
regulatory and transactional aspects of payment law. Setting out the parameters of
‘‘payment law,” the article examines the federal legislative powers in relation to
bills and notes as well as banking, in broader constitutional and historical context,
and argues for federal jurisdiction. A possible legislative role for the provinces is
also discussed.
L’auteur se penche dans cet article sur la compe´tence le´gislative au Canada
relativement aux aspects re´glementaire et transactionnel des lois sur les paiements.
En soulignant les caracte´ristiques de ces lois, il e´tudie les pouvoirs le´gislatifs
fe´de´raux à l’e´gard des lettres de change, des billets, des activite´s bancaires et dans
un contexte constitutionnel et historique plus large, il en vient a` la conclusion qu’il
s’agit d’une compe´tence fe´de´rale. L’auteur e´voque e´galement un rôle le´gislatif
e´ventuel pour les provinces.
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1. INTRODUCTION
‘‘Payment” is broadly defined to mean ‘‘any act offered and accepted in
performance of a money obligation.”1 In its simplest sense, ‘‘payment” signifies
the performance of an obligation by the delivery by the payer to the payee2 of
*

1

2

Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto (bgeva@os
goode.yorku.ca); Counsel, Torys, Toronto. For research assistance, I am grateful to
Leonidas Mylonopoulos of the 2016 graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law School.
Views expressed in this article as well as all errors
are solely mine.
Charles Proctor, ed., Goode on Payment Obligations in Commercial and Financial
Transactions, 2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2009) at 11 [Goode, Payment
Obligations].
There is no such thing as ‘‘a man paying himself.” See Faulkner v. Lowe (1848), 154 E.R.
628, 2 Ex. 595 at 597 [Ex.], at 630 [E.R.], per Pollock C. (in argument). Hence,
‘‘[p]ayment, necessarily implies two distinct persons.” John S. James, ed., Stroud’s
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monetary objects, which at present consist of banknotes and coins (‘‘cash”). At
the same time, a payment mechanism can broadly be described as any method of
payment facilitating the transmission of monetary value, particularly in the form
of account debits and credits redeemable to monetary objects, that enables the
payer to avoid the transportation of monetary objects and their physical delivery
to the payee. It also makes monetary objects available for withdrawal. A
payment mechanism is initiated by the payer’s instructions to a third-party
(‘‘paymaster”) to make the payment.3 Instructions may be written, electronic,
and, under some conditions, oral.
The operation of a payment mechanism in payment of a debt is premised on
the discharge of a debt owed by the payer to the payee by virtue of an authorized
payment made by the paymaster. Where the paymaster is the payer’s debtor, and
to the extent of the sum paid, payment to the payee discharges both the payer’s
debt to the payee and the paymaster’s debt to the payer. Alternatively, not
having owed to the payer, a paymaster carrying out payment, besides discharging
the payer’s debt to the payee, becomes entitled to payment from the payer.
Regardless, a paymaster’s payment to the payee may be either in monetary
objects or by means of a debt owed to the payee by someone designated by the
payee to receive payment. In fact, the paymaster itself may be so designated.
In the ordinary course of business, both the paymaster and the receiver of
payment for the payee are Payment Service Providers (‘‘PSPs”). Typically, PSPs
are deposit-taking institutions, such as banks,4 with which the payer and payee
maintain deposit accounts. Banks exchange customers’ payment instructions and
pay each other resulting amounts owed in the exchange. The interbank exchange
is termed a ‘‘clearing” and the ensuing payment is termed a ‘‘settlement.” In a
clearing, payment instructions may be processed either manually or in an
automated system, and either in bulk or individually. Payment instructions may
be settled either bilaterally or multilaterally, as well as either on a deferred net
settlement basis (DNS) or in real time such as in an RTGS (real-time gross
settlement) system. Typically, for each currency,5 at least the large banks settle
on the books of the central bank of the country of the currency. A small bank
may settle on the books of a large bank acting as its correspondent. For its part,
a non-bank PSP requires the services of a bank for both incoming and outgoing
customers’ payments.
The national payment system has been said to be ‘‘one of the principal
components of a country’s monetary and financial system” and therefore

3
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Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, 5th ed. vol. 4 (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1977) s.v. ‘‘payment” at 1337.
For an extensive discussion on payment mechanisms, see Benjamin Geva, The Payment
Order of Antiquity and the Middle Ages: A Legal History (Oxford and Portland Oregon:
Hart, 2011) at 15 67.
For more on deposit taking, banks, and banking, see Part 4, below.
The two distinct meanings of ‘‘currency” are further set out below in this Part.
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‘‘crucial to a country’s economic development.”6 Being an entire scheme
consisting of institutions, arrangements, and rules facilitating monetary
payments within, into, and out of a country, usually in the currency that the
country has adopted,7 a national payment system has been defined as ‘‘the
configuration of diverse institutional arrangements and infrastructures that
facilitates the transfer of monetary value between . . . parties.” 8 To that end, the
modern payment system has been described as consisting of ‘‘a complex set of
arrangements involving such diverse institutions as currency, the banking system,
clearing houses, the central bank, and government deposit insurance.” 9
Monetary value is transferred in the form of cash, often referred to as
‘‘currency,” here meaning banknotes and coins.10 Alternatively, monetary value
is transferred as a non-cash payment, under what is frequently referred to as a
‘‘payment transaction,” which ‘‘typically involve[s] a complex process of money
transfers from the deposit (or credit) account of the payer at one financial
institution to the account of the payee [possibly but not necessarily] at another
financial institution.”11 A payment transaction is carried out by banks via
clearing facilities and may be completed by means of an interbank settlement on
the books of the central bank. In the process, the payee’s bank replaces the payer
as the payee’s debtor.
In its report on core principles for systematically important payment systems
(‘‘SIPS”), the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (‘‘CPSS”) of the
Bank for International Settlement (‘‘BIS”) identified ‘‘legal risk” as one of five
types of risk that can arise in payment systems and disrupt their operation. 12 To
6

7

8
9

10
11
12

Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (‘‘CPSS”), General Guidance for
National Payment System Development (Basle: Bank for International Settlement, 2006)
at 7 [GGNPSD].
Currency is referred to as the ‘‘national currency” or ‘‘official currency” of the country. It
is the unit of account in which prices are set and domestic payments are to be made. Coins
and banknotes (‘‘currency”) denominated in that unit of account are usually ‘‘legal
tender,” in which a debtor may pay and which a creditor must accept in discharge of
private and public debts. Typically, the central bank is the guardian of the value of that
unit of account, the issuer of coins and banknotes denominated in it, and the depositary
of domestic banks’ reserve or settlement accounts in that unit of account. ‘‘Currency,”
‘‘national currency,” and ‘‘legal tender” are defined (albeit incompletely) in, e.g., Bryan
A. Garner, ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 2009) at 440 and
979. For more satisfactory definitions of ‘‘legal tender” visit <http://www.merriam
webster.com/dictionary/legal%20tender> or <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_
tender#cite_note 0>.
GGNPSD, supra note 6 at 7.
Marvin S. Goodfriend, ‘‘Money, Credit, Banking, and Payment System Policy” in David
B. Humphrey, ed., The US Payment System: Efficiency, Risk and the Role of the Federal
Reserve (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990) 247 at 247.
The two distinct meanings of ‘‘currency” are further set out below in this Part.
GGNPSD, supra note 6 at 7.
CPSS, Core Principles for Systematically Important Payment Systems (Basle: Bank for
International Settlements, 2001) at 5.

4

BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW

[31 B.F.L.R.]

meet such a risk, Core Principle I requires a systematically important payment
system to have ‘‘a well-founded basis under all relevant jurisdictions.” 13
Nevertheless, the ‘‘legal risk” addressed by the SIPS report is narrowly
confined to participants in the banking or clearing and settlement domain, is
directed only at systematically important payment systems, and focuses on the
elimination of the settlement default risk, with the view to achieving speedy
completion of the settlement process in a safe, efficient, and certain manner.
Subsequently, however, in its 2006 Report titled General Guidance for National
Payment System Development (‘‘GGNPSD”), BIS went further. It endorsed the
promotion of legal certainty through the development of a transparent,
comprehensive, and sound legal framework for the payment system as a
guideline for national payment system development.14
Against this background, payment law is a body of law addressing the
following:
1. What constitutes ‘‘money”;
2. The payment instructions to pay money;
3. Who may provide payment services;
4. The PSP-to-customer domain, covering the relationship between the
customer, whether payer or payee, and the customer’s PSP;
5. The customer-to-customer domain, addressing the relationship between
the payer and the payee;
6. The PSP-to-PSP domain, covering the relationships and transactions
among PSPs in processing and settling payment instructions; and
7. Who sets the overall policy, and who provides guidance and regulation.
In Canada, under section 91 of the Constitution Act,15 exclusive legislative
power is assigned to Parliament ‘‘to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good
Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes
of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.”
Since payment systems and methods are not addressed by the Constitution Act, it
is tempting to argue that, if only for that reason, they fall under federal
jurisdiction. However, specific powers enumerated in the Constitution Act touch
upon payments, and hence complexities are introduced.
Section 91 of the Constitution Act confers on the Parliament of Canada
exclusive legislative power in relation to ‘‘Matters coming within [enumerated]
Classes of Subjects” which include ‘‘Currency and Coinage”; ‘‘Banking,
Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money”; ‘‘Bills of Exchange
and Promissory Notes”; and ‘‘Legal Tender.”16At the same time, section 92 of
the Constitution Act assigns to each province the exclusive power to ‘‘make Laws
13
14
15

16

Ibid. at 3.
Supra note 6 at 5, 38 42 (Guideline 10) and 63 67 (Annex 4).
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5
[Constitution Act] (originally passed as the British North America Act).
Ibid., ss. 91(14), 91(15), 91(18), and 91(20), respectively.
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in relation to Matters coming within [enumerated] Classes of Subjects” which
include ‘‘The Incorporation of Companies with Provincial Objects”; ‘‘Property
and Civil Rights in the Province”; and ‘‘Generally all Matters of a merely local or
private Nature in the Province.”17
The above-mentioned four legislative powers assigned to Parliament relate to
‘‘money,” with which payment is made.18 ‘‘Money” is defined in a leading
English case to be ‘‘that which passes freely from hand to hand throughout the
community in final discharge of debts . . . being accepted equally without
reference to the character or credit of the person who offers it and without the
intention of the person who receives it to consume it . . .”19 More broadly, money
is said to be a medium of exchange, a store of value (in fact of purchasing
power),20 and a unit of account.21 Typically, in its concrete form, it consists
today of coins and banknotes sanctioned by the state. However, in modern times,
the narrow ‘‘monetary base” of a country is taken to consist of the obligations of
its central bank, both on banknotes it issues and on deposits it holds for
commercial banks in their settlement (or reserve) accounts. The broader ‘‘money
supply” in the hands of the public is taken to consist of such banknotes issued by
the central banks (plus coins for small change issued either by the central bank or
a government agency), together with demand deposits, held by the public in
commercial banks (‘‘bank money”). It is this ‘‘money supply” that reflects the
purchasing power of a given society.22
‘‘Legal tender”23 is money that, at least in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, a debtor may offer and the creditor must accept in discharge of a
17
18

19
20

21

22

23

Ibid., ss. 92(11), 92(13), and 92(16), respectively.
This power arguably extends to all means of payment even when they fall short of
‘‘money.” See e.g. Bradley Crawford, ‘‘Reward Miles: An Important New Medium of
Payment” (2013) 28 B.F.L.R. 213. See also Robert Kerr, ‘‘The Scope of Federal Power in
Relation to Consumer Protection” (1980) 12:1 Ottawa L. Rev. 119 at 133.
Moss v. Hancock, [1899] 2 Q.B. 111 (Que. B.D.) at 116.
William Stanley Jevons, Money and the Mechanism of Exchange (London, Henry S. King
& Co., 1875) at 13 does not include this element in the definition. Indeed, money is a store
of value only in the sense of being a ‘‘surplus” liquid resource available in one’s hands for
acquiring new commodities as may be needed and wished for.
Nigel Dodd, The Sociology of Money: Economics, Reason & Contemporary Society (New
York, Continuum, 1994) at xv. For Geoffrey Ingham, The Nature of Money (Cambridge,
U.K.: Polity, 2004) e.g. at 198, ‘‘money” is effectively something that ‘‘[r]egardless of its
form and substance” answers the promise and description provided (and measured) by
the unit of account.
This is so since the essence of banking is lending the money on deposit, so that effectively
both the depositors and the borrowers can use it. For a detailed economic perspective, see
e.g. H.H. Binhammer & Peter S. Sephton, Money, Banking, and the Canadian Financial
System, 8th ed. (Scarborough: Nelson, Thomson Learning, 2001) at 197 220 (banking
and the creation of money) and 387 432 (monetary controls and central banking).
For example, the general principle under s. 8(1) of the Canadian Currency Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. C 52, is that ‘‘a tender of payment of money is a legal tender if it is made (a) in
coins that are current under Section 7 [generally meaning ‘‘issued under the authority of
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debt.24 ‘‘Currency” has two meanings:25 it is both money in a tangible form (that
is, nowadays, coins and paper money in the form of banknotes), and the unit of
account in which coins and banknotes are denominated and monetary values are
set.26
Undoubtedly then, legislative powers conferred on Parliament under section
91 of the Constitution Act in relation to ‘‘Currency and Coinage,” ‘‘Banking” and
the ‘‘Issue of Paper Money,” and ‘‘Legal Tender” give Parliament exclusive
jurisdiction in relation to ‘‘money.” Similarly, payment instructions embodied in
‘‘Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes” fall under exclusive federal
jurisdictions. At the same time, according to the powers enumerated under
section 92 of the Constitution Act, local non-bank PSPs and clearing houses, as
well as private law matters affecting payments, appear to be assigned to exclusive
provincial jurisdiction.
However, taking into account the overlap among legislative powers and,
particularly, the encroaching impact of the enumerated federal powers on
provincial jurisdiction, the plot thickens. Against this background, this article
examines federal powers in relation to banking as well as bills and notes with the
view of ascertaining their reach, on their own and in conjunction with powers
relating to money, so as to establish exclusive or at least complete federal
jurisdiction on payments.
The ensuing analysis proceeds as follows. Part 2 discusses legislative power in
relation to bills and notes. It examines both the meaning of ‘‘bills” and ‘‘notes”
and the aspects relating to them that fall under federal jurisdiction. Part 3
discusses the possible expansion of the bills-and-notes power beyond the natural
meaning of these words. Part 4 addresses the ‘‘banking” legislative power as the
most promising option for a broad federal power relating to payments. Part 5
sets out options for the exercise of legislative powers by the provinces.
Concluding Part 6 recommends comprehensive federal regulation and
legislation of all payment methods and systems.

24

25

26

. . . the Royal Canadian Mint Act”]; and (b) in notes issued by the Bank of Canada
pursuant to the Bank of Canada Act intended for circulation in Canada.”
Cf. Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 2009)
s.v. ‘‘legal tender” at 979, defined as ‘‘[t]he money (bills and coins) approved in a country
for the payment of debts, the purchase of goods and other exchanges for value.” For
more satisfactory definitions of ‘‘legal tender” visit
<http://www.merriam webster.com/dictionary/legal%20tender> or
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_tender#cite_note 0>.

‘‘Currency” and ‘‘national currency” are defined (albeit incompletely) in, e.g., Black’s
Law Dictionary, ibid. s.v. ‘‘currency” at 440, s.v. ‘‘legal tender” at 979.
For example, under s. 3(1) of the Canadian Currency Act, supra note 23, ‘‘The monetary
unit of Canada is the dollar.”
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2. LEGISLATIVE POWER IN RELATION TO BILLS AND NOTES
Under subsection 91(1)(18) of the Constitution Act, ‘‘Bills of exchange and
promissory notes” (‘‘bills and notes”) constitute one of ‘‘the Classes of Subjects”
assigned to exclusive federal jurisdiction. The concluding clause of section 91 is
thus to be read as stating that ‘‘any Matter coming within [‘bills and notes’] shall
not be deemed to come within the Class of Matters of a local or private Nature
comprised in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned
exclusively to the legislatures of the Provinces.” According to Falconbridge, this
‘‘makes it plain that some of the classes of subjects enumerated in section 92 in
general terms (notably ‘property and civil rights in the province’) must be
modified or limited in their scope so as to leave room for the classes of subjects
enumerated in section 91.”27 It follows that provincial legislation in matters
coming within ‘‘bills and notes” is constitutionally invalid, notwithstanding the
fact that it could be viewed as legislation ‘‘in relation to matters coming within
. . . Property and Civil Rights in the Province” under section 92(13) of the
Constitution Act.
Central to the ensuing analysis pertaining to this legislative power is the
doctrine of progressive interpretation as a means by which courts have been able
to ensure that the Constitution Act, 1867, which has been amended infrequently
since its enactment, is adapted to changes in Canadian society. According to
Hogg, the doctrine stipulates that the general language used to describe the
various heads of power is not to be ‘‘frozen in the sense in which it would have
been understood in 1867.”28 Instead, the Act must be given a progressive
interpretation so that it can be adapted to new conditions and ideas. Thus, in
Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General) (1929),29 the Privy Council held that ‘‘the
[Constitution] Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and
expansion within its natural limits.” Hogg believes that the metaphor is now
more generally accepted. He emphasizes that progressive interpretation does not
enable the courts to go beyond the normal constraints of statutory
interpretation. All that progressive interpretation dictates is that the original
understanding is not binding forever, and that new ideas, conditions, or
inventions can fit within the constitutional language.30
The expression ‘‘matters coming within . . . Bills of exchange and promissory
notes,” to which exclusive federal legislative power applies under subsection
91(1)(18) of the Constitution Act, is not entirely self-explanatory. In principle,
27

28

29

30

Arthur Wyckoff Rogers, Falconbridge on Banking and Bills of Exchange, 7th ed.
(Toronto, Canada Law Book, 1969) at 24 [Falconbridge on Banking].
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. supp. (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) at
15 48.
(1929), [1929] UKPC 86, 1929 CarswellNat 2, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 98, (sub nom. Reference re
s. 24 of the Constitution Act, 1867) [1929] 3 W.W.R. 479, [1930] A.C. 124 (Jud. Com. of
Privy Coun.) at para. 54.
Hogg, supra note 28 at 15 50.
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three sets of questions arise. The first is the meaning of ‘‘bills and notes” to which
this legislative power applies. The second is which aspects pertaining to bills and
notes are ‘‘matters coming within bills and notes.” The third is whether the
meaning and function of bill and notes warrant the extension of the bills and
notes legislative power to related instruments and facilities. The first two
questions are discussed in this part, while the third question is discussed below in
Part 3. The remaining scope for provincial jurisdiction is linked to the second
question and is discussed below in Part 5. Whether the meaning of ‘‘bills and
notes” has been changed (the first question) and whether the power to legislate in
relation to bills and notes is to be given a broader meaning are two ways in which
the doctrine of progressive interpretation is considered.

(a) What Are ‘‘Bills and Notes”?
Exercising its power under subsection 91(1)(18) of the Constitution Act,
federal Parliament passed the Bills of Exchange Act (‘‘BEA”).31 Under its section
16(1),
A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing, addressed by
one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the
person to whom it is addressed to pay, on demand or at a fixed or
determinable future time, a sum certain in money to or to the order of a
specified person or to bearer.

A specific category of the bill is the ‘‘cheque,” defined in section 165(1) as ‘‘a
bill drawn on a bank, payable on demand.”
Finally, under section 176(1),
A promissory note is an unconditional promise in writing made by one
person to another person, signed by the maker, engaging to pay, on
demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in
money to, or to the order of, a specified person or to bearer.

Certainly, on their own, the BEA definitions do not necessarily set the limits
as to the types of instruments to which the federal power in relation to bills and
notes may apply. In the absence of a dictionary meaning separate from that
provided by statute, I discuss the meaning of these terms by reference to their
history. Particularly, I examine the history of bills and notes, so as to explore
whether their evolution has been an ongoing and ever-expanding process that
permits the use of a broader definition than the one chosen by Parliament in the
BEA.
In the form in which we recognize them, bills of exchange transformed from
those used in Medieval Continental Europe.32 During the late Middle Ages, the
bill of exchange served to execute an exchange contract in order to facilitate both
31
32

Currently, R.S.C. 1985, c. B 4.
For a detailed history, see e.g. Raymond Adrien De Roover, L’Evolution de la Lettre de
Change XIVe XVIIIe Sie`cles (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1953).
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credit extension and the transmission of money from place to place. Under such a
contract, an exporter of goods borrowed money in the local currency from a
local exchange banker. Having agreed to repay the loan in the foreign market to
which the goods were to be transported, and in the currency of that market, the
exporter instructed his representative in the foreign market to repay the exchange
banker’s representative or correspondent in that market. Typically, it was
envisaged that payment in the foreign market would be made out of the proceeds
realized from the sale of the goods there. Payment was typically due at usance:
namely, after a certain fixed period of time determined by mercantile custom for
each pair of commercial centres.33
Subsequently, towards the end of the 17th century, bill-of-exchange practice
had been significantly transformed such that the instrument had also come to
facilitate the remittance of funds between two places domestically and in
situations unrelated to the performance of an exchange transaction. In England,
the turning point is demonstrated by Chat v. Edgar (1662).34
Cheques and banknotes evolved in England as part of the goldsmith banking
system over the second half of the 17th century. Goldsmiths received deposits
and issued receipts with respect to them.35 The receipt contained the goldsmith’s
undertaking to pay on demand when presented with the receipt. It came to be
known as a goldsmith or banker note and evolved into an early form of the
promissory note.36 The latter partly superseded the deed or ‘‘specialty” as a
debtor’s credit payment obligation. Alternatively, rather than taking goldsmith
notes, a depositor was allowed to draw upon the goldsmith various amounts up
to the amount of the deposit. Such drafts, payable on demand and made out to a
payee or bearer, were cheques.37
Notwithstanding Holdsworth38 and Holden39 to the contrary, the cheque did
not emerge as ‘‘a special type of bill of exchange.” In effect, the cheque had been
originated in Ptolemaic Egypt.40 Having reappeared in Continental Europe as an
improvement to a funds transfer in which both the payer and payee had to attend
33

34
35

36

37
38

39
40

Much of the historical discussion below is derived from chapters 8 to 10 of Geva, supra
note 3.
(1662), 83 E.R. 1156, 1 Keb. 636 (Eng. K.B.).
Richard David Richards, The Early History of Banking in England (New York: A.M.
Kelley, 1965) at 40 43 (reprint of the 1929 edition).
James Milnes Holden, The History of Negotiable Instruments in English Law (London:
University of London The Athlone Press, 1955; W.M.W. Gaunt & Sons, 1993 (reprint))
at 70 73.
For this development, see Holden, ibid. at 206 10, 212 14.
William Searle Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 2d ed. (London: Methuen, Sweet
& Maxwell, 1937; 1966 (reprint)) vol. 8 at 190.
Holden, supra note 36 at 204 (from which the ensuing quote is taken). See also at 208.
Raymond Bogaert, ‘‘Note sur l’Emploi du Cheque dans l’Egypte Ptolemaique” in
TrapeziticaAegyptiaca, Recueil de Recherches sur la Banque en E´gypte Gre´co Romaine
(Florence: Edizioni Gonelli, 1994). See Geva, supra note 3 at 150 152.
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the banker together,41 the cheque was ‘‘imported” by England. During the late
17th century, it became apparent that both bills and cheques were orders, and
that they operated as payment mechanisms so that the cheque appeared to fall
into the definition of the bill as if it was a subcategory of the bill. 42 Ultimately, in
Keene v. Beard (1860),43 Byles J. pointed out two unique features of a cheque that
distinguish it from an ordinary bill of exchange. Otherwise, however, Byles J. was
of the view that a cheque ‘‘has . . . all the incidents of an ordinary bill of
exchange”44 and, as such, ‘‘falls within the class of ordinary bills of exchange.”45
By the end of the 18th century, clear distinctions were drawn between the
three types of instruments: particularly, that the bill and cheque were orders and
the note was a promise. However, common elements also crystallized. Thus, it
was held then that both the order (for bills and cheques) and the promise (for
notes) must be ‘‘unconditional.” Holden46 cites Pearson v. Garrett (1693)47 as the
source for the rule that an instrument payable upon the happening of a
contingency is not a bill or note. He also identifies48 Jenney and Others v. Herle
(1723)49 as a possible source for the rule under which a bill must not be stated to
be payable out of a particular fund. Numerous cases requiring that ‘‘[t]he
payment of money mentioned in a bill or note must be certain” so as not to be
subject to contingencies are cited by Bayley,50 whose book, originally published
in 1789, is viewed by Holden as ‘‘most valuable” and ‘‘scholarly” so that ‘‘[i]t
may be regarded as the first modern text-book on the law relating to negotiable
instruments.”51
As well, primarily in the course of the 18th century, bills, notes, and cheques
had become negotiable.52 ‘‘Negotiability” denotes (i) the transferability of a legal
title to a sum of money by the delivery (either with or without an endorsement) of
the paper containing the liability to pay it, and (ii) the potential for such
41
42

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

51
52

For a discussion and sources, see Geva, supra note 3 at 363 64.
Cf. Robert Samuel Theodore Chorley, ‘‘The Cheque as Mandate and Negotiable
Instrument” (1939) 60 Journal of the Institute of Bankers 391 at 392, speaking on the
mandate on a cheque as taking the form of a bill of exchange as ‘‘a historical accident.”
(1860), 8 C.B.N.S. 372, 141 E.R. 1210 (Eng. C.P.).
Ibid. at 381 (C.B.), 1213 (E.R.).
Ibid. at 381 (C.B.), 1214 (E.R.).
Supra note 36 at 107.
(1693), 87 E.R. 371, 4 Mod. 242 (Eng. K.B.).
Supra note 36 at 106.
(1723), 92 E.R. 386, 2 Ld. Raym. 1361 (Eng. K.B.).
John Bayley, Short Treatise on the Law of Bills of Exchange, Cash Bills, and Promissory
Notes (London: Temple Bar, 1789) at 3 (authorized facsimile: University Microfilms
International, 1981). Relevant cases are cited and summarized at 3 5.
Holden, supra note 36 at 143.
For Dutch origins, see Dave De Ruysscher, ‘‘Innovating Financial Law in Early Modern
Europe: Transfers of Commercial Paper and Recourse Liability in Legislation and Ius
Commune (Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries)” (2011) 19:5 E.R.P.L. 505.
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transferability to confer on the transferee title free from third-parties’ adverse
claims and prior parties’ defences.53 In effect, ‘‘negotiability” became the
common denominator bringing bills, cheques, and notes into a unified, specific
branch of law.54
It is apparent that in passing the BEA in 189055 and following the U.K.
definition from 1882, far from restricting the meaning of ‘‘bills of exchange and
promissory notes” or even taking upon itself to define the terms from scratch, the
Canadian Parliament adhered to what had been viewed then as bills of exchange
and promissory notes. Furthermore, it seems evident that the meaning of ‘‘bills”
and ‘‘notes,” as had been crystallized by the end of the 18th century, has not
evolved since then. Accordingly, in ascertaining the plain meaning of these
words, it is difficult to argue that Parliament has unfettered discretion or a free
hand to define and extend the list of ‘‘bills of exchange and promissory notes” or
to confer on them new features that depart materially from the historical
understanding of the features of such instruments. Parliament may redefine and
refine specific elements and certainly provide for other reforms, but only for
instruments that have been fundamentally viewed as of the 18th century or so as
bills or notes.

(b) What Matters Come Within ‘‘Bills and Notes”?
Having explored the meaning of ‘‘bills and notes,” I proceed to examine the
meaning of ‘‘matters coming within bills and notes”56 which is not an entirely
self-explanatory expression. The uncertainty stems from the multifaceted nature
of a bill or note and the law applicable to it as such. According to Chafee, 57 ‘‘a
bill or note . . . is both a chattel and a chose in action.” Being ‘‘a tangible scrap of
paper,” it is a chattel. Containing ‘‘a bundle of contracts,” it is also a chose in
action. As such the bill and note is governed by the general law dealing with
property and obligations.58
Ownership of a bill or note ‘‘involves not only the right to possess the thing
but the right to sue” parties liable thereon.59 As such, a bill or note is ‘‘a
53

54

55
56

57
58

59

Denis Victor Cowen & Leonard Gering, Cowen on the Law of Negotiable Instruments in
South Africa, 5th ed., vol. 1 (Cape Town: Juta, 1985) at 31 36.
For pointing out that, in order to circulate freely, a negotiable instrument cannot be
‘‘encumbered with conditions and contingencies” and hence must contain an uncondi
tional promise or order, see e.g. Carlos v. Fancourt (1794), 101 E.R. 272, 5 Term Rep. 482.
Bills of Exchange Act, S.C. 1890, c. 33.
This is an abbreviated form of ‘‘matters coming within . . . Bills of exchange and
promissory notes” under s. 91(18) of the Constitution Act. It is adopted here for
convenience.
Z. Chafee, ‘‘Rights in Overdue Paper” (1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 1104 at 1109.
See e.g. Anthony Gordon Guest, Chalmers and Guest on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and
Promissory Notes, 17th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2009) at ss. 5 062 to 5 066,
dealing with the transmission of negotiable instruments by operation of law.
Chafee, supra note 57 at 1109.
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documentary intangible,” or more specifically, ‘‘a document of title to money,”
serving as ‘‘the physical embodiment of the payment obligation.”60 Thereunder,
‘‘[t]he debt claim is ‘merged’ or ‘reified’ into the paper evidencing the claim.” 61
Effectively it is akin to what German civilian jurisprudence calls a Wertpapier,62
defined in Article 965 of the Swiss Code of Obligations as ‘‘any document in
which a right is incorporated in such a way that it cannot be claimed nor
transferred to others . . . without the document.” 63
Anglo-Canadian law may not have accorded bills and notes all the features
of the Wertpapier. Indeed, the transfer of a bill or note to a ‘‘holder” 64 by
‘‘negotiation”65 with the intention to convey ownership passes the legal title to
the claim to the debt embodied in the instrument. At the same time, AngloCanadian law has failed to recognize the legal title of a non-holder transferee by
delivery of a bill or note. Rather, it treats him as a mere equitable assignee. 66 As
well, in principle, bills and notes may be assigned without the transfer of
possession.67 However, Anglo-Canadian law developed a specialized distinct
body of law dealing with specific proprietary and obligatory characteristics of a
bill or note, such as in matters relating to the form, issue, liability, negotiation,
60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

E. McKendrick, ed., Goode on Commercial Law, 4th ed. (London: Penguin Books, 2010)
at 513. See also Cowen & Gering, supra note 53 at 53.
G. Gilmore, ‘‘The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase” (1954) 63 Yale L.J.
1057 at 1064.
I agree with Cowen & Gering, supra note 53 at 94, that the word ‘‘Wertpapier” cannot be
well translated to English, so that words such as ‘‘security” or ‘‘commercial paper” do
not convey its accurate sense.
Swiss Code of Obligations, trans., vol. 3, rev. ed. (Zurich: Swiss American Chamber of
Commerce, 2003). On the German Wertpapier, see in general Leon Dabin, Fondements
du Droit Cambiare Allemand (Liège: Faculté de Droit de Liège, 1959) at 236 84. For a
comprehensive discussion on the German conceptual framework, as well as whether it
sheds additional light on the nature of a negotiable instrument, see Cowen & Gering, ibid.
at 79 98 (where a slightly different translation, albeit to the same effect, of the Swiss
provision is reproduced at 82). Their negative conclusion as to whether the Wertpapier
sheds additional light on the nature of a negotiable instrument, ibid. at 110, is criticized by
J.T. Pretorius’ review of the book, (1986) 103 S.A.L.J. 151 at 154 56. On the negotiable
instrument as Wertpapier, see also F.R Malan, J.T Pretorius & S.F. Du Toit, Malan on
Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes in South African Law, 5th ed. (Durban:
LexisNexis, 2009) at 4, 7.
Being ‘‘the payee or endorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it, or the bearer
thereof.” See BEA, supra note 31, s. 2.
Under BEA, ibid., s. 59(1), ‘‘A bill is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to
another in such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder of the bill.”
See e.g. Aldercrest Developments Ltd. v. Hamilton Co Axial (1958) Ltd. (1973), 1973
CarswellOnt 240, 1973 CarswellOnt 240F, [1974] S.C.R. 793, 37 D.L.R. (3d) 254
(S.C.C.); affirming 1970 CarswellOnt 750, [1970] 3 O.R. 529, 13 D.L.R. (3d) 425 (Ont.
C.A.), where the bona fide party liable on a note got a discharge from the out of
possession transferor.
Guest, supra note 58, s. 5 067.
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and discharge. Governed by this law, a bill or note is said to be not only an
obligation (or obligations) contained in a chattel but also a ‘‘negotiable
instrument,” namely, ‘‘a document governed by the specific legal principles
applying to negotiable instruments.”68
The set of laws dealing with the application of general law is ‘‘the law of bills
and notes in the wide sense.” At the same time, the set of laws providing for the
specific elements of the bill or note as a negotiable instrument is described as ‘‘the
law of bills and notes in the strict sense.”69
Nonetheless, while over the years negotiability has become a distinctive mark
of bills, cheques, and notes,70 the nature of a bill or note as a ‘‘negotiable
instrument” does not convey the full scope of what falls into ‘‘strict sense”
matters. Historically, the negotiability quality was a feature attributed to bills
and notes as they had been evolving irrespective of this quality. The focus of the
evolution had been the liability on a bill or note in ‘‘an action upon the case” on
the basis of ‘‘the custom of merchants.”71 Regardless, the BEA even provides for
a non-negotiable bill or note.72 Hence, ‘‘negotiability” is a too narrow
component of the ‘‘strict sense” law, the evolution of which had been well
underway irrespective of whether, and before, these instruments acquired
negotiability. As a subject of a specific set of laws, a bill or note is thus a
‘‘negotiable instrument” in the sense of being governed by the law addressing
matters pertaining specifically to bills and notes which include, but nonetheless
are not restricted to, negotiability.
Certainly strict-sense aspects are ‘‘matters coming within bills and notes”
allocated to the federal government under section 91(18) of the Constitution Act.
There is, however, a controversy as to whether federal ‘‘bills and notes”
jurisdiction is limited solely to these aspects. Based on a historical approach,
LeClair submits that the answer is in the affirmative, so that the exclusive
jurisdiction given in 1867 to the federal Parliament is confined to matters coming
within the law of bills and notes in the strict sense.73 On the other hand,
Crawford,74 in the footsteps of Falconbridge,75 appears to consider Parliament’s

68
69

70
71
72

73

74
75

Aharon Barak, ‘‘The Nature of the Negotiable Instrument” (1983) 18 Isr. L.R. 49 at 75.
See in general Aharon Barak, ‘‘The Requirement of Consideration for Bills or Notes in
Israel” (1967) 2 Isr. L.R. 499 at 500 505. See also Bradley Crawford, The Law of Banking
and Payment in Canada, vol. 3, looseleaf (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2008) at ss.
20:30.20(2) and 21:40.80(3).
See Part 2(a), above.
See e.g. Chat and Edgar Case (1663), supra note 34.
See BEA, supra note 31, s. 20(1), governing ‘‘a bill [containing] words prohibiting
transfer, or indicating an intention that it should not be transferable.”
Jean LeClair, ‘‘La Constitution par l’histoire: portée et étendue de la compétence fédéral
en matière de lettres de change et de billets à ordre” (1992), 33 Les Cahiers de droit 535.
Crawford, Banking and Payment, vol. 3, supra note 69, s. 23:40.80(2).
Rogers, Falconbridge on Banking, supra note 27 at 586.
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jurisdiction to be broader so as to include ‘‘legislation ancillary or incidental to
bills and notes legislation” and dealing with ‘‘wide sense” matters.
The problem I see with Crawford’s view is that the very existence of federal
ancillary and incidental jurisdiction in Canada is not settled. In the absence of
such an express power in the Constitution Act, as for example in the United
States76 and Australia,77 the existence of an ancillary federal power in Canada is
controversial.78 On one occasion, it was said that ‘‘the ancillary power doctrine”
exists and yet is ‘‘limited to what is truly necessary for the effective exercise of
Parliament legislative authority.”79 On another occasion, the existence of the
doctrine was rejected; rather it was said that federal legislation is to be upheld as
long as it has a ‘‘rational, functional connection” with the relevant federal head
of power.80 In an attempt to reconcile between these two views, it was held that
the former view applies only in the case of a serious encroachment by federal
legislation on a provincial power.81 Disapproving of this compromise, Hogg
describes it as making ‘‘the answer to a simple question too complicated, too
discretionary, and therefore to unpredictable.”82
In limiting federal jurisdiction to strict-sense matters on the basis of his
understanding of history, LeClair’s view appears to smack of ‘‘originalism.” At
the same time, his approach undermines uniformity throughout the country —
which historically might well have been the very reason for assigning jurisdiction
in relation to bills and notes to Parliament. If so, it is up to Parliament to
determine where lack of uniformity in the area may be tolerated so as to withhold
legislation. I am thus not opposed to the ‘‘rational, functional connection” test, 83
except that, as explained in Part 4 below, in the footsteps of Hogg, I am not sure
of its utility. Rather, in my view, to the extent that the ancillary power doctrine
does not exist in Canada without restrictions, the expression ‘‘matters coming
within bills and notes” ought to be taken to be broad enough to cover the entire
law of bills and notes, in its wide as well as its strict sense. It is unlikely, indeed,
that the Constitution Act purported to deprive the Parliament of Canada of the
76
77
78
79

80

81

82
83

U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, s. 51(39).
Hogg, supra note 28, s. 15.9(c).
R. v. Foundation Co. of Canada Ltd. (1979), 1979 CarswellNat 629, 1979 CarswellNat
189, (sub nom. R. c. Thomas Fuller Construction Co. (1958) Ltd.) [1980] 1 S.C.R. 695, 12
C.P.C. 248, 106 D.L.R. (3d) 193, 30 N.R. 249, [1979] S.C.J. No. 124 (S.C.C.) at 713
[S.C.R.] [emphasis in the original].
Papp v. Papp (1969), 1969 CarswellOnt 963, [1970] 1 O.R. 331, 8 D.L.R. (3d) 389 (Ont.
C.A.) at 335 336 [O.R.].
City National Leasing Ltd. v. General Motors of Canada Ltd., 1989 CarswellOnt 956,
1989 CarswellOnt 125, EYB 1989 67447, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, 68 O.R. (2d) 512 (note), 43
B.L.R. 225, 24 C.P.R. (3d) 417, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 255, 93 N.R. 326, 32 O.A.C. 332, [1989]
S.C.J. No. 28 (S.C.C.) at para. 69.
Hogg, supra note 28, s. 15.9(c).
Supra note 81.
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power to legislate in relation to the general proprietary and obligatory elements
of the instrument.84 Furthermore, if any legislation that addresses bills and notes
meets the ‘‘rational, functional connection” test, I do not see any substantive
difference between the adoption of this test and saying that federal legislative
power covers wide-sense matters.85 In fact, as it stands now, the BEA contains a
few ‘‘wide sense” provisions. Examples are section 50 in relation to a signature by
procuration86 and section 162 dealing with the exchange rate calculation for a bill
payable in Canada in foreign currency.
Accordingly, the distinction between strict- and wide-sense matters becomes
irrelevant in ascertaining the reach of the federal jurisdiction in matters relating
to bills and notes. At the same time, as will be discussed in Part 5 below, the
distinction becomes important in relation to the provincial legislative power to
affect such matters.

3. ‘‘PAYMENT ORDERS” AND THE POWER TO LEGISLATE IN
MATTERS RELATING TO BILLS AND NOTES
At the moment, a paperless electronic authorization record does not qualify
as an instrument falling under the BEA. The latter facilitates the electronic
presentment of cheques and yet requires an original paper cheque to exist.87 The
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (‘‘PIPEDA”)88 is
a federal piece of legislation providing in sections 31—51 for electronic
equivalency for paper documents. The express purpose of this part of the Act
is to ‘‘provide for the use of electronic alternatives where federal laws
contemplate the use of paper to record or communicate information or
transactions.”89 However, in terms of requirements under federal law for a
document to be in writing, an electronic document will suffice only if the federal
law is listed in Schedule 2 or 3 of the Act.90 These Schedules include specific
84

85

86
87

88
89
90

Cf. the approach in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Be´langer (Trustee of), 1926
CarswellQue 3, [1926] S.C.R. 218, (sub nom. Bélanger v. Royal Bank) 7 C.B.R. 285,
[1926] 2 D.L.R. 929 (S.C.C.) at 934 [D.L.R.]; affirmed 1928 CarswellNat 47, (sub nom.
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Larue) 8 C.B.R. 579, [1928] 1 D.L.R. 945, [1928] 1 W.W.R.
534, [1928] A.C. 187 (Jud. Com. of Privy Coun.), dealing with the scope of the
bankruptcy power of the Parliament of Canada (under what is now Constitution Act s.
91(21)).
In fact, arguably, in passing (under the bills and notes legislative power) s. 16 to the
Depository Bills and Notes Act, S.C. 1998, c. 13, under which ‘‘A party is liable to pay [on
a depository bill or note] whether or not the depository bill or note constitutes a binding
contractual obligation,” Parliament provided for a wide sense matter.
Rogers, Falconbridge on Banking, supra note 27 at 586.
BEA, supra note 31, ss. 163.1 163.6, dealing with official image and electronic
presentment.
S.C. 2000, c. 5.
Ibid. s. 32.
Ibid. s. 41.
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sections of the Federal Real Property and Federal Immovable Act, Canada Labour
Code, and Federal Real Property Regulations.91 This significantly limits the scope
of PIPEDA in this regard. However, the responsible authority in respect of a
provision of a federal law has the power to order or amend Schedule 2 or 3 by
adding or removing a reference to that federal law.92 While the BEA is not listed
in the Schedules, I do not see any preclusion from including it.
For paper payment instructions, jurisdiction issues may not always be easily
determined. For example, travellers’ cheques or postal orders may not be, strictly
speaking, cheques. Nevertheless, to the extent that they are treated as cheques, 93
it may be argued that they fall under the federal bills and notes legislative power.
Furthermore, Goodwin v. Robarts (1875)94 stands for the proposition that the
‘‘law merchant,” consisting of ‘‘the usages of merchants and traders . . . ratified
by the decisions of Courts of law” is an ongoing source for conferring
negotiability on new types of instruments other than those provided for by the
BEA. Accordingly, certain financial instruments not complying with BEA
requirements may nonetheless be treated in financial markets as ‘‘negotiable.” 95
However, as set out immediately below, it remains to be seen whether courts will
read the federal bills or notes power to cover negotiable instruments in general,
and not only bills (including cheques) and notes.
On the one hand, plain reading of section 91(18) of the Constitution Act does
not support such a broad legislative power. Federal jurisdiction under this
section is not stated to relate to negotiable instruments; rather, it is stated to
relate to bills and notes — and was exercised in relation to them even where they
are not negotiable.96 Prima facie, then, as a matter of ‘‘Property and civil rights
in the province” under section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, a province is not
precluded from conferring negotiability on new types of instruments. Nor is a
province precluded from legislating in relation to negotiable instruments other
than bills and notes. In fact, the power of a province to legislate with regard to
negotiable securities97 and documents of title to goods98 has not been questioned,

91
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94
95
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Ibid. Sch. 2, Sch. 3.
Ibid. s. 49.
See e.g. Eliahu Peter Ellinger, ‘‘Travellers’ Cheques and the Law” (1969) 19 U.T.L.J. 132.
(1875), L.R. 10 Ex. 337 at 346; affirmed (1876), 1 App. Cas. 476 (U.K. H.L.).
See e.g. Eliahu Peter Ellinger, ‘‘Legal Problems of Modern Commercial Paper” (1990 91)
6 B.F.L.R. 65.
Features of negotiability are denied to instruments under BEA, supra note 31, ss. 20(1)
(words prohibiting transfer), 68 (restrictive endorsement), and 174 (‘‘Not negotiable”
cross).
Cf. Ontario Securities Transfer Act, S.O. 2006, c. 8, s. 70, under which ‘‘A protected
purchaser, in addition to acquiring the rights of a purchaser, also acquires the
purchaser’s interest in the security free of any adverse claim.”
For a provincial statute governing negotiable warehouse receipts, see e.g. Warehouse
Receipts Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. W 3.
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and it is not all that obvious how the case will be different for negotiable debt
instruments that are neither bills nor notes.99
On the other hand, in Miller v. Race (1758), even before banknotes issued by
the Bank of England became legal tender,100 Lord Mansfield rationalized their
negotiability on the need to ‘‘give . . . them the credit and currency of money” as if
they were ‘‘current coin.”101 More than a hundred years later, negotiable
instruments were said to ‘‘form part of the currency of the country.” 102
Negotiability is thus a concept overarching and linking currency, paper money,
and legal tender, matters that fall under exclusive federal legislative
competence.103 This appears to support the existence of an exclusive federal
power over the negotiability of either all circulating debt instruments or those
used as means of payment. Under this view, both the attribution of negotiability
and the regulation of its aspects in relation to such debt instruments are under
exclusive federal jurisdiction.104 The conferment of negotiability by the ‘‘law
merchant” on them is then a ‘‘strict sense” federal law matter. Negotiability
conferred on such debt instruments, whether by Parliament or by a ‘‘law
merchant” rule, may be regulated by the federal government and by the law
merchant; either way, it is free from intervention by provincial law. Whether
under this reasoning federal jurisdiction extends to other aspects of such debt
instruments, or even further, to non-circulating non-negotiable payment
instruments, or even more generally, to all methods of payments not premised
on negotiability, will be further discussed immediately below.
Certainly, not all payment orders are embodied in cheques or other types of
bills of exchange. Functional differences among various payment methods have
not been overlooked by courts in diverse contexts. For example, in Tenax
Steamship Co. v. Brimnes (The) (Owners) (1974),105 addressing the difference

99
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101
102
103
104
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In fact, s. 28(4) of the Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P 10 [OPPSA],
insofar as it applies to ‘‘instruments” that are not bills and notes is such a provision. At
the same time, insofar as the section purports to apply also to bills and notes and is
inconsistent with BEA, s. 55 (1) (holding in due course requirements) OPPSA, s. 28(4) is
superseded by federal law under the federal paramountcy doctrine discussed in Part 4,
below. In essence, OPPSA, s. 1 defines ‘‘instrument” to be a writing that evidences a right
to the payment of money and is of a type that in the ordinary course of business is
transferred by delivery with any necessary endorsement or assignment. It includes but is
not limited to a bill or note.
Under s. 6 of the Bank of England Act, 1833 (U.K.), 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 98.
(1758), 97 E.R. 398, 1 Burr. 452 (Eng. K.B.) at 457 [Burr.], at 401 [E.R.] [emphasis added].
Foster v. MacKinnon (1869), 20 L.T. 887 (Eng. C.P.) at 889.
Constitution Act, supra note 15, ss. 91(1), 91(14), 91(16), and 91(20), respectively.
This view is advanced by Jacob S. Ziegel & David L. Denomme, The Ontario Personal
Property Security Act: Commentary and Analysis, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths
Canada, 2000) at 20.
[1974] 3 All E.R. 88 (Eng. C.A.) at 111 112; affirmed (1972), [1973] 1 All E.R. 769 (Que.
B.D.).
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between payment by cheque and payment by credit (or telex) transfer, Megaw
L.J. opined that:
there is no useful analogy between, on the one hand, a payment made
by delivery . . . of a cheque . . . and, on the other hand, telex instructions
to pay . . . The receipt of a cheque is not the receipt of mere
instructions. It is the receipt of an instrument
a chose in action
which has an inherent value, because the holder of it obtains, by virtue
of his holding of the document, a legal right to a sum on money, which
right he can enforce, if necessary by action. The receipt of a telex
containing instructions to transfer funds from one account into another
account confers on the holder of the telex no such right. It is
instructions to pay, not a payment . . .

Not being ‘‘cheques” (or other types of bills), telex instructions do not appear
to be covered by the ‘‘bills and notes” power under section 91(18) of the
Constitution Act.
Indeed, payment transactions are either credit or debit transfers. Where the
payer’s instructions are communicated directly to the payer’s bank, there is a
credit transfer. Where the payer’s instructions are communicated to the payer’s
bank indirectly, namely via the payee and the payee’s bank, there is a debit
transfer. To that end, in a debit transfer, it is common not to focus on the payer’s
instructions, but rather, on the payee’s instructions initiated on the basis of the
payer’s authorization.
In a credit transfer, the payer’s instructions communicated to the payer’s
bank ‘‘push” funds to the payee. In a debit transfer, the payee’s communication
to the payee’s bank ‘‘pulls” or ‘‘draws” funds from the payer’s account. Thus, as
a matter of banking operation, a credit transfer commences with a debit to the
payer’s account, and is completed with a credit posted to the payee’s account.
Conversely, a debit transfer may commence with a credit posted (albeit
provisionally) to the payee’s account and is completed with a debit to the
payer’s account. It is thus the payer’s instructions to the payer’s bank that initiate
the banking process in a credit transfer. In contrast, it is the payee’s instruction
to the payee’s bank that initiate the banking operation in a debit transfer.
Cheques are processed as debit transfers. Telex instructions are processed as
credit transfers. For certain then, telex transfers are not ‘‘cheques.”
Similarly, instructions commencing preauthorized, or in fact all debit
transfers initiated other than by the deposit of a cheque, are also, strictly
speaking, not ‘‘cheques.” This is so notwithstanding the application to such
instructions of the same banking process and even of some rules relating to the
enforcement of the payer’s engagement on them.106 Unlike the receipt of the
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See e.g. New York Life Insurance Co. c. Langelier Côte´ (1991), 1991 CarswellQue 274, 44
Q.A.C. 14, [1992] R.R.A. 135 (C.A. Que.) (conditional payment) and Esso Petroleum Co.
Ltd. v. Milton, [1997] EWCA Civ. 927, [1997] C.L.C. 634 (Eng. C.A.) (payer’s defences to
an action upon dishonour).
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cheque, those instructions do not have ‘‘an inherent value” on which the
instruction-giver may be sued.
This, however, may not conclude the matter. Indeed, on more technical
grounds, an instruction initiating a debit or credit transfer is not a cheque, if only
because, or at least as long as, it does not direct payment to be made on
demand.107 At the same time, as long as it is unconditional, is made in writing, is
signed, states a sum as well as a payment date, and directs payment to a specified
person, such instruction may satisfy the definition of a bill.108 So even as such an
instruction is not handled as a bill or cheque governed by the BEA, it is not
inevitable to see the legislative power under section 91(18) of the Constitution Act
as not covering it.
The case of the credit card payment is an even closer call. In a nutshell,
parties to a typical inter-institution credit card transaction are a cardholder, a
merchant, an issuing institution, and an acquiring institution. Parties to
underlying bilateral contracts are the cardholder—issuer, the
cardholder—merchant, and the merchant—acquirer. The issuing and acquiring
institutions are members in a card association (such as Visa or MasterCard) and
are contractually bound to each other by the association rules.109 In a typical
scenario, the cardholder hands the card to the merchant and authorizes payment.
The merchant seeks the issuer’s authorization. The acquirer credits the
merchant’s account and collects from the issuer. Collection is through the
clearing system of the card association, while settlement of netted amounts is
through usual interbank channels. The issuer sends to the cardholder a periodic
statement that the cardholder pays according to their agreement.
Relying on the decision of Millett J. at first instance and of the Court of
Appeal in Charge Card Services Ltd., Re (1986),110 Woolf L.J. held in Customs
and Excise Commissioners v. Diners Club Ltd. (1989)111 that:
where a card is produced by a cardholder and accepted by a retailer and
the cardholder signs the sales voucher the cardholder is unconditionally
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Being under BEA, supra note 31, s. 165(1) ‘‘a bill drawn on a bank, payable on demand.”
Being under BEA, supra note 31, s. 16(1) ‘‘an unconditional order in writing, addressed
by one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it
is addressed to pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in
money to or to the order of a specified person or to bearer.”
‘‘The contractual hierarchy” in the typical credit card situation is set out in Aldo Group
Inc. v. Moneris Solutions Corp., 2012 ONSC 2581, 2012 CarswellOnt 11002, [2012] O.J.
No. 1931 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 10 25; affirmed 2013 ONCA 725, 2013
CarswellOnt 16221, 118 O.R. (3d) 81, 22 B.L.R. (5th) 44, 51 C.P.C. (7th) 221, 370 D.L.R.
(4th) 491, 313 O.A.C. 122 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal refused 2014 CarswellOnt 5661,
2014 CarswellOnt 5662 (S.C.C.) and is further discussed throughout the judgment.
(1986), [1986] 3 All E.R. 289, [1987] Ch. 150 (Eng. Exch.); affirmed [1988] 3 All E.R. 702,
[1988] 3 W.L.R. 764 (Eng. C.A.).
[1989] 2 All E.R. 385 (Eng. C.A.) at 393.
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discharged from liability to pay to the retailer the amount of the cost of
the goods or services.

Accordingly, in the eyes of Woolf L.J., in connection with the typical credit
card scenario, it seemed ‘‘unlikely that the customer is ever indebted to the
retailer.” The credit card itself is certainly neither a bill nor a cheque. Rather, it is
a plate or device used by the cardholder to initiate payment.
At issue, however, is not the card but rather the sales slip, sales voucher, or
sales draft — all of which are interchangeable — signed by the cardholder. In
Canada, manually signed paper vouchers in a card transaction have become
increasingly rare; however, it is useful to examine case law that addressed them to
get a sense of the judicial treatment given to them in the broader context of an
analysis as to the possible reach of section 91(18) of the Constitution Act.
Thus, in North Shore Credit Union v. Cumis General Insurance Co. (1986),112
MacKenzie J.A. acknowledged that in a credit card transaction ‘‘the credit risk
of non-payment by the cardholder rests with the issuer and not with the
merchant’s financial institution or acquirer.” He nevertheless considered ‘‘[t]he
foundation of the credit card system” to be ‘‘that a credit card slip will be
honoured for payment throughout the sequence from cardholder to merchant
and presentation is a direction to pay.”113 He concluded that the sales slip
constituted a ‘‘request by the drawer upon the drawee to pay money,” which was
a ‘‘draft,”114 the latter being an order115 that is a bill or cheque as long as it
fulfills the other requirements under the BEA.
However, leading Canadian scholars do not support the reasoning leading to
the conclusion that sales slips are drafts. According to Ogilvie, 116
The cheque analogy fails in a number of ways. Unless certified or the
parties otherwise agree, a cheque operates as a conditional payment
and is revocable insofar as the drawer may countermand it at any time
prior to actual payment. This cannot be said of a credit card
transaction because the cardissuer has made a separate contractually
binding promise to the merchant that the merchant will be paid,
regardless of whether the cardholder pays the cardissuer. A valid
112

113
114
115

116

(2003), 2003 BCCA 692, 2003 CarswellBC 3178, 22 B.C.L.R. (4th) 219, 8 C.C.L.I. (4th)
38, [2004] 3 W.W.R. 651, 192 B.C.A.C. 199, [2004] I.L.R. I 4269, 315 W.A.C. 199, [2003]
B.C.J. No. 2923 (B.C. C.A.).
Ibid. at para. 18.
Ibid. at para. 19.
In ibid. at para. 15, MacKenzie J.A. cited the accepted definition of ‘‘draft,” taken from
Hunter v. Bowyer (1850), 15 L.T.O.S. 281 (Eng. Ex. Ch.) by Pollock CB, according to
which, ‘‘[T]he word ‘‘draft”, no doubt, includes a bill of exchange as well as a cheque. It is
a nomen generale, which embraces every request by the drawer upon the drawee to pay
money.”
Margaret H. Ogilvie, Canadian Banking Law, 2d ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1998)
at 706. She restates her position in Margaret H. Ogilvie, Bank and Customer Law in
Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irvin Law: 2013) at 404 05.
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countermand of a cheque restricts the cause of action on the sale to the
buyer and the seller. Failure of the cardissuer to pay results in an action
for breach of the cardissuer merchant contract and between those
parties alone. Finally, the merchant has no alternative, but that chosen
by the cardholder, in the bank which pay the merchant.

Crawford117 ‘‘originally found [the reasoning in North Shore Credit Union v.
Cumis] to be a very satisfying theory to explain the legal foundations of credit
cards” as ‘‘[i]t accords with both the modern practice and the known history of
credit cards.” However, in his final analysis, he points out that there are two
problems with it as an explanation of the legal foundation of the modern credit
card system:
It is not a reason for imposing any liability upon the drawee (i.e., the
credit card issuer) to pay money. Just as a draft in the form of a bill of
exchange is not binding upon the drawee until he accepts or pays it, so
the credit card schemes were designed to enable the issuer to pay
cardholders’ sales drafts, but not to compel it to do so in every case. And
that freedom from unconditional liability has been preserved to this day
by the careful wording of the issuers’ written agreements with
cardholder and merchants . . . Also, if the old common law of
negotiable drafts were to be fully exploited as the legal foundation for
credit cards, it would impose a secondary liability on the drawer to pay
the merchant if the drawee did not . . .
A second difficulty that I have with the theory of Mackenzie J.A. is that
it is no longer supported by the facts. When credit cards first became
common and popular forms of payment, the unvarying practice was for
the merchant to obtain the signature of the customer on a specially
prepared multi leaved form of sales draft, with appropriate text direct
the card issuer to pay. The recital of the facts by Mackenzie J.A.
indicate that the original practice was already changing by the time the
sales draft in the North Shore case were signed: the text on the sales
drafts is quoted by the learned justice of appeal as ‘‘authorizing” the
issuer to pay merchant, not directing it to do so. Moreover, those
original flimsy sales draft forms have now been universally replaced in
favour of several new patterns of dealing . . .

As well, in Marcotte c. Fe´de´ration des caisses Desjardins du Que´bec (2012),118
the Quebec Court of Appeal added an argument of its own, observing
117

118

Bradley Crawford, The Law of Banking and Payment in Canada, vol. 2, looseleaf
(Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2008) at s. 13:10.10(2)(d) [emphasis in the original].
Marcotte c. Fe´de´ration des caisses Desjardins du Que´bec, 2012 QCCA 1395, 2012
CarswellQue 7781, 2012 CarswellQue 13752, EYB 2012 209730, [2012] R.J.Q. 1526
(C.A. Que.) at para. 68; reversed in part 2014 CSC 57, 2014 SCC 57, 2014 CarswellQue
9003, 2014 CarswellQue 9004, (sub nom. Marcotte v. Fédération des caisses Desjardins
du Québec) [2014] 2 S.C.R. 805, 25 B.L.R. (5th) 277, 374 D.L.R. (4th) 643, 462 N.R. 296
(S.C.C.) at para. 18.
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that the slip signed by the cardholder at the time of payment (or its
electronic equivalent for cards with PINs) is much more akin to an
acknowledgement of debt [or a reimbursement undertaking to reim
burse the issuing institution according to the agreement that binds
them] than to a bill of exchange that requires a drawer, drawee and
payment order benefiting the merchant . . .

With respect, to one degree or another, these positions can be challenged, or
at least qualified. Thus, and at least as long as this is not negated by a statute in
relation to an instrument governed or created by it,119 whether an instrument is a
‘‘bill,” ‘‘note,” or ‘‘cheque” is determined exclusively by its form. Conditions
contained in side agreements do not detract from the negotiability of an
instrument that does not state to incorporate them. For example, it does not
matter that under the drawer—drawee contract a cheque is typically drawn on a
positive balance in a bank account and that, similarly, under the card-issuer and
cardholder agreement, a credit card payment is typically to be charged to a credit
line within agreed upon credit limits. As long as the instrument complies with the
definition of a bill or cheque it is indeed a bill or cheque. Similarly, the nature of
payment made by an instrument, whether conditional or absolute, is not part of
the inquiry as to whether it is a bill or cheque. In general, whether payment is
absolute or conditional depends in the first place on the intention of the parties,
and in theory, even a ‘‘regular” payment by cheque (unsupported by card) may
be held in a given case to be intended as ‘‘absolute” without undermining the
qualification of the instrument as a cheque. Where the payment is supported by
card, an intention for absolute payment may be presumed to exist, without
denying the nature of the sales slip as a cheque. It is the form alone that
determines whether an instrument is a ‘‘cheque” or a ‘‘bill.” Furthermore,
although payment by cheque is presumed to be conditional, 120 payment by
certified cheque or bank draft may be absolute.121 They are all, nevertheless,
‘‘cheques.”122
While a personal cheque can be countermanded under section 167 of the
BEA, this is certainly not the case for a certified cheque. 123 A card issuer’s
‘‘separate contractually binding promise to the merchant” 124 has so far not been
119

120

121

122

123

As was the issue in Bank of Montreal v. Bay Bus Terminal (North Bay) Ltd. (1977), 1977
CarswellOnt 490F, 1977 CarswellOnt 490, (sub nom. Bank of Canada v. Bank of
Montreal) [1978] 1 S.C.R. 1148, 76 D.L.R. (3d) 385, 16 N.R. 93 (S.C.C.). The application
of this principle to a provincial statute, Gee, Re, 1928 CarswellOnt 244, [1928] 3 D.L.R.
54, 62 O.L.R. 184 (Ont. C.A.), is less convincing but is irrelevant for our purposes here.
The classic authority is Charge Card Services Ltd., Re, [1986] 3 All E.R. 289, [1986] 3
W.L.R. 697 (Eng. Exch.); affirmed [1988] 3 All E.R. 702 (Eng. C.A.).
For a certified cheque, see Boyd v. Nasmith, 1888 CarswellOnt 23, 17 O.R. 40, [1888] O.J.
No. 73 (Ont. C.P.) (as may have been qualified by Gaden v. Newfoundland Savings Bank,
1899 CarswellNfld 1, [1899] A.C. 281, C.R. [12] A.C. 128 (Jud. Com. of Privy Coun.)).
See in general Benjamin Geva, ‘‘Irrevocability of Bank Drafts, Certified Cheques and
Money Orders” (1986) 65:1 Can. Bar. Rev. 107.
Ibid. at 124.
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conceptualized.125 Regardless, it is not fundamentally different from that of the
certifying bank or that of a drawer of a bank draft. In fact, in facilitating
communication between the merchant and the issuer (albeit through the acquirer
and/or a central switch) so as to enable online authorization, the credit card
system is an enhancement of the cheque guarantee card.126 The latter system,
under which the merchant had to rely exclusively on the card itself and the
identification of the holder presenting it, never took root in Canada. This system
did not facilitate the online credit card authorization that ensures at least (i) that
the card itself was neither reported lost or stolen nor had been cancelled, and (ii)
that the cardholder had not exceeded his or her line of credit. Not surprisingly
then, the cheque guarantee card was much more amenable to fraud.
Indeed, as Crawford argues, if the sales slip is a bill or cheque, upon the
default of the card issuer, recourse ought to be available against the cardholderdrawer under section 129(a) of the BEA. This is contrary to the view that the
credit card payment is absolute so as to release the cardholder. However, a
drawer may disclaim liability by inserting an express stipulation to that effect
under section 33(a) of the BEA. As indicated, release of the drawer from liability
may be implied in the case of a certified cheque. Hence, dispensation with
recourse is not inconsistent with viewing the sales slip as a bill or cheque.
This responds to Ogilvie and to the first problem addressed by Crawford.
The response to his second objection as well as to the quoted language of the
Quebec Court of Appeal in Fe´de´ration v. Marcotte is more subtle. As illustrated
above, whether a sales slip is a ‘‘bill” or ‘‘cheque” depends on the specific
language contained in the particular sales slip. Additionally, in the case of a
cheque, conditions usually exist between the drawer (payer) and the drawee.
What matters is that they do not appear on the cheque itself. A standard form
cheque printed by the bank does not contain any condition, such as, for example,
availability of adequate balance (or an overdraft privilege). The order on a
standard form cheque is not even stated to pay out of the account, as the order
may then be taken to be conditional on the existence of the account or balance in
it; only a reference to the account is permitted.127 At the same time, in a credit
card payment, even if the merchant’s entitlement may be qualified, this is not
different from the general rule for an instrument on which the bank is liable. 128 It
is not the entitlement that is unconditional, but rather the language of the
promise or order forming the basis for it.
124
125

126

127
128

Ogilvie, Canadian Banking Law, supra note 116 at 706.
This is so in the four party credit card transactions where the issuer is not the acquirer
and as such has no contractual privity with the merchant.
On this point, as part of the evolution of consumer or retail payment systems, see
Benjamin Geva, ‘‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers”
(2003) 38 Can. Bus. L.J. 207 at 212 223.
BEA, supra note 31, s. 16(3)(a).
See e.g. Benjamin Geva, ‘‘The Autonomy of the Banker’s Obligation on Bank Drafts and
Certified Cheques” (1994) 73:1 Can. Bar. Rev. 21 56 and addendum at 280 82.
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Admittedly, however, the distinction between ‘‘order” and ‘‘authorization”
appears to be more problematic. Thus, according to Guest,129
A bill is an order. It must require, and not merely request the drawee to
pay. It must, therefore, in its terms be imperative and not precative . . .
An authority to pay, for example ‘‘we hereby authorise you to pay to
our account to the order of G” is not an order to pay . . .

In his treatise, Crawford is even more categorical: 130 ‘‘. . . a command,
however politely framed, is required. A mere authorization to pay is not
sufficient . . .”
In support for his view, Guest cites Hamilton v. Spottiswoode (1849).131
Crawford mentions this case and yet for the insufficiency of the ‘‘mere
authorization” he cites Russell v. Powell (1845).132 However, careful reading of
both cases indicates that they are not all that straightforward. In Russell v. Powell
(1845), the language was ‘‘we do hereby authorize and require you to pay.” True,
this was not a ‘‘mere authorization,” and yet nothing in the judgment turned on
it. Rather, even if authorized and required, in the facts of the case, payment was
supposed to be out of a particular fund, which disqualified the instrument from
being a bill. In Hamilton v. Spottiswoode (1849), Pollock CB stated that the
document did not ‘‘import an absolute intention that the money should at all
events be paid, but merely authorise the defendant to pay it” and hence was not a
bill of exchange. However, so far as the reported case reveals, the dispute evolved
around the dependence of the authorization on the existence of a fund, on the
basis of which it was argued that the document expressed ‘‘a mere authority . . .
to pay . . . upon a contingency which might never happen.” Nothing turned on
the existence of language merely authorizing payment. Furthermore, both cases
dealt with alleged violation of stamping requirements; had the documents been
found to be bills of exchange, the absence of stamping could have resulted in the
release of a party liable on technicalities. This of course could explain the
inclination to declare the documents as not being bills of exchange.
In connection with a cardholder’s authorization, as long as the cardholder
complies with the terms of the cardholder’s agreement, the issuer, between itself
and the cardholder, is bound to pay. Whether a payee or merchant is entitled to
recover from the drawee or issuer does not depend at all on the drawer—drawee
or cardholder—issuer relationship. Hence, in a commercial situation, a court
may treat the ‘‘authorization” language as amounting to an order. At the same
time, as indicated, the statutory test for the application of the BEA is extremely
and exclusively formal. Hence I cannot predict with certainty how a court will
treat the authorization language in a credit card sales slip.
129
130
131
132

Guest, supra note 58, s. 2 008.
Crawford, Banking and Payment, vol. 3, supra note 69, s. 22:20.20.
(1849), 154 E.R. 1182, 4 Ex. 200.
(1845), 153 E.R. 538, 14 M. & W. 418.
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A sales slip may be drafted so as to constitute an agreement by the
cardholder to reimburse the issuer. Whether such a sales slip is governed by the
BEA depends on whether it is a note. Thus, an acknowledgement of debt owed
by the cardholder to the issuer is not a promise to pay the debt. Whether it is
conditional or unconditional, an acknowledgement is not a ‘‘promissory
note.”133 At the same time, a promise to pay the issuer is a ‘‘promissory note,”
but only insofar as it is ‘‘unconditional.” When such a ‘‘promissory note”
payable to the issuer is delivered to the merchant, the latter may be viewed as an
agent on behalf of the cardholder for the purpose of delivering it to the issuer
through the acquirer. Alternatively, the merchant taking such a ‘‘promissory
note” payable to the issuer may be viewed as a ‘‘remitter” who will then transfer
it to the issuer. In the latter scenario, the merchant is in exactly the same position
as a remitter of a bank draft or money order who purchases it for value from the
issuing bank for transfer to the designated payee and who, by transferring it to
the payee, pays the payee for goods or services the remitter thereby acquires from
the payee.
A sales slip will not satisfy the BEA requirements where it contains neither a
promise nor order (as, for example, in the case of an acknowledgement of debt)
and where either the order or promise is conditional. Indeed, it is possible to
argue that the act of delivery by the cardholder to the merchant of a signed sales
slip in whatever form, as a culmination of the card payment process, is an
unconditional order issued by the cardholder to the issuer to pay. However, on
its own, this is not a written and signed order.
Where the sales slip contains an order by the cardholder to the issuer side by
side with a promise by the cardholder to pay the issuer ‘‘subject to and in
accordance with the terms of the cardholder agreement,” 134 the promise is
‘‘conditional” so as not to be a promissory note. Indeed, in such a case, on its
own, and unlike the promise, the order may be read as not subject to the
cardholder agreement. Nevertheless, arguably in such a case, the cardholder’s
order may be construed as conditional on the cardholder’s reimbursement
promise. Stated otherwise, the order may be read as instructing the issuer to
make payment to the merchant in return for the cardholder’s promise to
reimburse it. This would be the case also when both the order and the promise
are stated unconditionally. In such a case, the cardholder’s reimbursement
promise may also be read as subject to the issuer’s complying with the order.
Stated otherwise, a combined unconditional order and promise may render each
to be conditional and dependent on each other. This, of course, may depend on
the specific language of the sales slip, and yet there is a chance that a combined
order and promise will be treated as dependent on each other.

133
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See e.g. Sheehan v. Mercantile Co. (1919), 45 O.L.R. 422 (Ont. H.C.) at paras. 22 23;
reversed 1920 CarswellOnt 162, 52 D.L.R. 538, 46 O.L.R. 581 (Ont. C.A.).
As was the case in, e.g., Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. McCray, 316 N.E.2d 209 (Ill.App.
1st Dist. 4th Div., 1974). The specific issue neither arose nor was dealt with by the court.
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There is another anticipated objection to viewing the sales slip as a bill or
cheque, even where it is drafted to be an unconditional order. The argument is
based on the fact that it is not envisaged that sales slips circulate and, hence, they
are not ‘‘negotiable.” My response is that, indeed, in the ordinary scheme of
things, bills of exchange and promissory notes are negotiable. However, whether
an instrument is a bill or note depends on compliance with formal statutory
requirements and not on the intention of the parties. Moreover, many
indisputably negotiable instruments are issued today with no intent whatsoever
that they will circulate. Such is the case for most cheques and possibly for notes
issued for bank loans. Furthermore, the negotiability of bills, cheques, and notes
can be negated by the maker of a note or drawer of a bill or cheque and the
instrument will nevertheless remain governed otherwise by the BEA.135
At present, instructions for a credit card payment are mainly given
electronically. As well, they can be communicated by mail, in which case the
language is not standardized. They can also be provided by phone, in which case
they are neither written nor signed. Neither electronic nor telephone order is a
bill of exchange, cheque, or promissory note. Whether a mail order qualifies
depends on its language. Similarly, instructions for a card payment
communicated over the Internet do not involve a written and signed
document. On the basis of the present understanding of what constitute a bill
or cheque, an electronic instruction cannot be viewed as such.
May Parliament decide to modify the definition of ‘‘cheques” (or even
‘‘bills”) and enlarge it to cover more and even all types of payment orders? It is
noteworthy that Parliament already significantly expanded the scope of
‘‘cheques” by redefining ‘‘bank” to ultimately include any CPA member, not
even necessarily a deposit-taker.136 Presumably then, it will be difficult to
challenge the power of Parliament to eliminate the medium restrictions on which
cheque orders are to be issued and provide for ‘‘electronic cheques,” 137 such as
the Interac email transfer.138 What may, however, be counterintuitive is the
inclusion in ‘‘cheques” of payment orders initiating credit transfers. 139
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See e.g. BEA, supra note 31, ss. 20(1) and 174.
Specifically, under BEA, ibid., s. 165(1), ‘‘A cheque is a bill drawn on a bank, payable on
demand.” For that purpose alone, ‘‘bank” is broadly defined in BEA, s. 164 by reference
to Canadian Payments Association membership to which non bank deposit taking
institutions and non deposit taking financial intermediaries also may qualify. See
Canadian Payments Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 21, s. 4.
Namely, an electronic payment order issued directly to the payee that can be negotiated
and deposited to an account like a paper cheque. It is also known as an electronic
payment order (EPO).
For a description of the service and system, see Crawford, Banking and Payment, vol. 2,
supra note 117, s. 16:60.30(1). The system is operated and cleared by Acxsys Corporation
and settled over either the LVTS or bilateral netting but not over the ACSS.
Discussed at the beginning of Part 3, following the discussion on The Brimnes, supra note
105.
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Be that as it may, the argument in Marcotte v. Fe´de´ration140 went beyond a
mere reliance on the language of the sales slip. Rather, it was argued that
‘‘payment by credit card is analogous to payment by bill of exchange” so as to
trigger exclusive federal jurisdiction under section 91(18) of the Constitution Act.
The analogy was premised on the fact that the merchant can present the sales slip
to the card issuer ‘‘to receive hard currency.” The Supreme Court of Canada
understood this reasoning to lead to the conclusion that ‘‘payment methods such
as gift cards and coupons would also seem to be classified as bills of exchange” 141
and rejected it altogether:142
This is not a case, as Desjardins argues, where the changed social
circumstances in Canada, namely the increased popularity of payment
by credit card as opposed to payment by cheque, would justify
reinterpreting s. 91(18) of the Constitution Act, 1867 so as to include
credit cards. ‘‘Bills of exchange” is a well established technical term
around which an extensive structure of legislation, notably the Bills of
Exchange Act, has developed. Although this Court has recognized that
the Canadian Constitution must be ‘‘capable of adapting with the times
by way of a process of evolutionary interpretation”, that evolution
must remain ‘‘within the natural limits of the text” (Canada (Attorney
General) v. Hislop, 2007 SCC 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429, at para. 94).
There has been no shift in how the term ‘‘bills of exchange” is defined in
Canada. While some of the effects of payment by credit card are the
same as payment by bills of exchange, the natural limits of the text of s.
91(18) of the Constitution Act, 1867 prevent it from being reinterpreted
to include credit cards.

The analysis in Part 2(a) of this article above supports this conclusion.
However, I respectfully submit that it did not fully meet Desjardins’ argument.
What was argued was not a redefinition of ‘‘bill of exchange” but rather an
adjustment or adaptation of the ‘‘bills and notes” legislative power under section
91(18) of the Constitution Act. Effectively, the argument aimed at reading this
provision as covering all payment orders and not being limited to ‘‘bills” no
matter what the latter is interpreted to mean. So understood, the argument is
premised on the fact that, at the time the Constitution passed, payment orders
were mostly if not exclusively paper cheques or other bills of exchange so that
what the drafters had in mind was to capture all payment methods. Had the
Court accepted the argument, all types of payment orders, paper and electronic,
initiated by card, telex, or otherwise, could have fallen within the federal ‘‘bills
and notes” power under section 91(18) of the Constitution Act.
The irony is that while, this analysis strikes as ‘‘progressive interpretation” of
the Constitution, as a matter of fact it also reflects its ‘‘original understanding.”
This brand of ‘‘originalism” is not premised on treating ‘‘bills and notes” as
140
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Supra note 118 (SCC).
Ibid. at para. 18.
Ibid. at para. 20.
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‘‘frozen concepts.”143 Rather, it focuses on the drafters’ likely original intention
to capture the whole range of payment methods — as they keep emerging and
developing.

4. DEPOSIT-TAKING AND LEGISLATIVE POWER IN RELATION TO
BANKING
The ‘‘bills and notes” legislative power covering cheques as payment
instructions reaches the customer-to-customer, customer-to-PSP, and PSP-toPSP domains with respect to them. It may, however, be far-fetched to see this
power extending to the customer—PSP/bank contractual relationship governing
cheque use. The organization and regulation of the clearing and settlement
system for cheques also appear to fall outside the ‘‘bills and notes” power.
Whether such matters fall under federal jurisdiction requires an examination of
the legislative power relating to ‘‘banking.”
Under Section 91(15) of the Constitution Act, ‘‘all Matters coming within”
‘‘Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money” are assigned
‘‘the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada . . .” Discussing
the scope of ‘‘[t]he legislative authority conferred by these words,” Tennant v.
Union Bank of Canada (1893) held that ‘‘banking” is ‘‘an expression which is
wide enough to embrace every transaction coming within the legitimate business
of a banker.”144 Under this reasoning, a federal statute dealing with a transaction
that an incorporated bank was authorized by law to make was held valid. This is
so notwithstanding the fact that, by its nature, such legislation addressed
‘‘Property and Civil Rights in the Province,” a subject assigned by Section 92(13)
to exclusive provincial jurisdiction.145 Subsequently, it was also held that
‘‘Banking” in section 91(15) is not limited to the extent and kind of business
carried on by banks in Canada in 1867.146
However, this broad legislative power was taken to underlie an
‘‘institutional” approach. 147 Thereunder, according to Canadian Pioneer
Management Ltd. v. Saskatchewan (Labour Relations Board) (1980),148
143
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Quoted terms are from Hogg, supra note 28 at 15 59.
(1893), 1893 CarswellOnt 35, [1894] A.C. 31, C.R. [10] A.C. 387, 5 Cart. B.N.A. 244 (Jud.
Com. of Privy Coun.) at para. 29.
Overlap of jurisdictions is recognized under the ‘‘double aspect doctrine” pronounced in
Hodge v. Queen, The (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117 at 130. However, under what came to be
known as ‘‘federal paramountcy,” ‘‘where there are inconsistent (or conflicting)
[competent] federal and provincial laws, it is the federal law which prevails.” See Hogg,
supra note 28 at 16 2 to 16 3.
Reference re Bill of Rights Act (Alberta), 1947 CarswellAlta 42, [1947] 4 D.L.R. 1, (sub
nom. Alberta (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General)) [1947] 2 W.W.R. 401,
[1947] A.C. 503, [1947] L.J.R. 1392, 63 T.L.R. 479, [1947] J.C.J. No. 5 (Jud. Com. of
Privy Coun.) at 9 [D.L.R.].
Those arguing that Tennant v. Union Bank stands for a functional approach, e.g., Darcy
Readman & Steve Laird, ‘‘The Constitutionality of the Alberta Treasury Branches”
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‘‘banking” is said to involve ‘‘a set of interrelated financial activities carried out
by an institution that operates under the nomenclature and terms of
incorporation which clearly identify it as having the distinctive institutional
character of a bank.” Thus, whether a given set of interrelated financial activities
carried falls ‘‘within the concept of banking as a business”149 depends on whether
they are carried out by an institution incorporated as a bank or by a non-bank
trust company; the answer is positive in the former case and negative in the latter.
For certain, the ‘‘banking” power extends to all aspects of payment law in
relation to federally chartered banks. However, at first blush, it seems to follow
that a business activity carried out by a trust company — in fact, by any nonbank entity — that duplicates that of banks is not ‘‘banking” and thus is outside
the federal legislative power relating to ‘‘banking.” However, upon reflection,
such a conclusion does not necessarily follow from Pioneer. The case concerned a
challenge to provincial jurisdiction over labour relations in a trust company. The
latter argued that it carries on a banking business and thus fell outside the reach
of the Provincial Legislature. In his judgment, Beetz J. noted that the
interpretation of Section 91(15) of the Constitution Act discussed above
followed both the ‘‘approach taken by Parliament” and its application by
courts, rather than an inherent limitation in the section. 150 Furthermore, he went
on to say that the institutional approach ‘‘is particularly helpful in a case where
what has to be decided is whether a given institution falls within the concept of
banking as a business, and not whether a legislative enactment is constitutionally
depending on its relationship to banking within the meaning of s. 91, head 15 of
the constitution”. More generally, ‘‘[t]he concept of banking as a business 151 and
the meaning of the word ‘banking’ in s. 91, head 15, are not necessarily coextensive; the meaning of ‘banking’ in the section might very well be wider than
the concept of banking as a business.”152
Stated otherwise, Pioneer does not preclude the extension of ‘‘banking” in
section 91(15) of the Constitution Act to activities carried out by non-bank
entities. In his separate judgment, Laskin C.J.C. specifically noted ‘‘the failure or
unwillingness of Parliament to legislate to the full limit of its powers” 153 and did
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(1998) 2 CBR (4th) 139 at 143, overlook the fact that Tennant v. Union Bank dealt only
with transactions carried out by those determined as banks under an institutional test.
(1979), 1979 CarswellSask 163, 1979 CarswellSask 159, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 433, 107 D.L.R.
(3d) 1, [1980] 3 W.W.R. 214, 80 C.L.L.C. 14, 018, 31 N.R. 361, 2 Sask. R. 217 (S.C.C.) at
para. 71, adopting the position presented by the Attorney General of New Brunswick.
Ibid. at para. 75.
Ibid. at paras. 73 74.
For speculation on the difference between ‘‘banking business” and ‘‘business of
banking” under banking legislation in Canada, see e.g. Gillian Lester, ‘‘The Regulation
of Foreign Banks in Canada: Milelli Marks a Decade of Ambiguity” (1991) 17 Can. Bus.
L.J. 430 at 435 444. See also C.C. Johnston, “Judicial Comment of ‘Banking Business’”
(1962) 2 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 347.
Pioneer, supra note 148 at para. 75.
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not rule out the possibility that ‘‘Parliament could have brought trust companies
within its regulatory authority in relation to banking” but ‘‘has chosen not to do
so.”154 In turn, Beetz J. acknowledged the difficulty of defining banking, which is
not a legal term, but rather a term evoking ‘‘economic notions which are
notoriously not amenable to the discipline of the law.”155
By reference to Laskin C.J.C.’s question in Pioneer, what are ‘‘the full limits
of [federal Parliament’s] power”156 in relation to ‘‘banking”? Primarily, the
search here is for the full extent of the federal power that would supersede
conflicting even if otherwise valid provincial law, rather than for only the core of
the federal power that could have precluded any validity from a conflicting piece
of provincial legislation.157
For the purpose of this article, what matters is whether payment transactions
and providers of payment services fall within the ambit of the banking legislative
power under section 91(15) of the Constitution Act. Besides federally chartered
banks, providers of such payment services may be other types of regulated
financial intermediaries — as well as other entities, particularly money
transmitters, a term used here to cover all non-financial intermediaries who
provide funds transfer or payment services (namely, facilitating non-cash
payments) to end users. In effect, whether money transmitters are to be
regulated and, if so, to what extent, is part of the broader emerging question: that
is, the regulation of shadow-banking.158 However, the route taken here is the
examination of the ‘‘full limits” only in connection with payment transactions
and payment service providers. At the same time, payment system participants
are not only front-end providers such as banks, other financial intermediaries,
and money transmitters. They also include back-end providers such as processors
as well as operators of retail payment infrastructure.159 To the extent that they
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Ibid. at para. 3.
Ibid. at para. 6.
Ibid. at para. 33.
Ibid. at para. 3.
Another way to put it is that the search here is for ‘‘Paramountcy” and not
‘‘Interjurisdictional Immunity,” as pronounced by Bastarache J. in Canadian Western
Bank v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 22, 2007 CarswellAlta 702, 2007 CarswellAlta 703, [2007] 2
S.C.R. 3, 409 A.R. 207, 75 Alta. L.R. (4th) 1, 49 C.C.L.I. (4th) 1, 281 D.L.R. (4th) 125,
[2007] 8 W.W.R. 1, [2007] I.L.R. I 4622, 362 N.R. 111, 402 W.A.C. 207, [2007] S.C.J. No.
22 (S.C.C.) at para. 114.
‘‘Shadow banking, as usually defined, comprises a diverse set of institutions and markets
that, collectively, carry out traditional banking functions but do so outside, or in ways
only loosely linked to, the traditional system of regulated depository institutions.” B.S.
Bernanke, ‘‘Rethinking Finance” (Speech delivered at the Russell Sage Foundation and
The Century Foundation Conference, 13 April 2012), online: <http://www.federalre
serve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120413a.htm>.
See e.g. Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI), Non Bank in
Retail Payments (Basle: Bank for International Settlement, 2014) at 9.
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act for front-end players, it is assumed that they fall under the jurisdiction that is
competent by reference to the front-end player itself.
‘‘Full limits” of ‘‘banking” in relation to payment transactions and service
providers are first to be explored by reference to the history of the banking
legislative power in the context in which it was passed. To that end, it was
observed that ‘‘the main trajectory of the law has been to honour the original
expressed intention of 1867 of ensuring a strong federal jurisdiction over matters
relating to the national economy, including banks.”160 What are then ‘‘the full
limits” under the ‘‘original expressed intention”? According to Binavince and
Fairley,161
At Confederation, the Founding Fathers had in mind an orderly and
uniform financial system for the new Dominion, subject to national
jurisdiction and control. Conventional wisdom suggests that the
Constitution Act, 1867 reflected this governing assumption in granting
to the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament the subject matter of
‘‘Banking, Incorporation of Banks and the Issue of Paper Money”
pursuant to section 91(15). Corollary heads of legislative power placed
1867 conceptions of the monetary and financial system unequivocally
in federal hands.

‘‘Corollary heads of power” specifically enumerated by the authors 162 are
‘‘Saving Banks” (s. 91(16)); ‘‘Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes” (s.
91(18)), ‘‘Interest” (s. 91(19)); ‘‘Legal Tender” (s. 91(20)); and ‘‘Bankruptcy and
Insolvency” (s. 91(21)). I should add also ‘‘Currency and Coinage” (s. 91(14)). 163
In Reference re Alberta Legislation,164 Hudson J. of the Supreme Court of
Canada observed that, when these heads of federal jurisdiction 165 are read
together, the cumulative effect is much greater than if the individual heads are
considered separately.166 Along these lines, it is arguable that, inasmuch as
160
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Margaret H. Ogilvie, ‘‘Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta: Cooperative Federalism and
the end of ‘Banking’” (2008 09) 47 Can Bus LJ 75 at 75.
Emilio S. Binavince & H. Scott Fairley, ‘‘Banking and the Constitution: Untested Limits
of Federal Jurisdiction” (1986) 65:1 Can Bar Rev 328 at 329.
Ibid.
Cf. powers listed by Ogilvie, Bank and Customer Law, supra note 116 at 8 who adds the
Regulation of Trade and Commerce (under s. 91(2)) but omits Bankruptcy and
Insolvency (under s. 91(21).
1938 CarswellAlta 88, [1938] S.C.R. 100, [1938] 2 D.L.R. 81, [1938] S.C.J. No. 2 (S.C.C.)
at para. 201; affirmed (1938), 1938 CarswellAlta 92, (sub nom. Alberta (Attorney
General) v. Canada (Attorney General)) [1938] 4 D.L.R. 433, [1938] 3 W.W.R. 337,
[1939] A.C. 117, 108 L.J.P.C. 1, [1938] W.N. 349 (Jud. Com. of Privy Coun.).
Namely, by reference to powers listed in s. 91 of the Constitution Act, supra note 15 ‘‘(2)
The regulation of trade and commerce; (14) Currency and coinage; (15) Banking,
incorporation of banks and the issue of paper money; (16) Savings banks; (18) Bills of
exchange promissory notes; (19) Interest; [and] (20) Legal tender.”
On this point see: Terence D. Hall, ‘‘Bank Promotion of Insurance: Canadian Western
Bank v. Alberta” (2004) 19 BFLR 457 at 465.
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federal jurisdiction explicitly covers money, cheques, and banking, it implicitly
extends to cover the entire PSP-to-PSP domain — that is, the clearing and
settlement of payment items — as well as all methods of transfers of monetary
value, as they keep evolving, that are essential to the proper functioning of a
modern national money economy. Along more concrete lines, it is also arguable
that under ‘‘progressive interpretation”167 the 19th-century power over bills,
cheques, and various forms of money is to be construed in the 21st century as
extending to all payment mechanisms initiated, in the footsteps of the bill and
cheque, by an order. After all, the Constitution ‘‘is a living tree which, by way of
progressive interpretation, accommodates and addresses the realities of modern
life.”168
Indeed, in the pursuit of a national financial system, Parliament has proven
that it can be assertive. On the whole, this assertiveness has been well received.
For example, in Re Alberta Legislation,169 Hudson J. stated by reference to the
Preamble of an Act of Parliament establishing a central bank for Canada that:
It is interesting to observe that the Bank of Canada Act, 1934
(Dominion), establishes a central bank ‘to regulate credit and currency
in the best interests of the economic life of the nation, to control and
protect the external value of the national monetary unit and to mitigate
by its influence fluctuations in the general level of production, trade,
prices and employment so far as may be possible within the scope of
monetary action, and generally to promote the economic and financial
welfare of the Dominion.’ No one doubts the constitutionality of this
Act . . .

More recently, in the Preamble to the Payment Clearing and Settlement Act
(PCSA),170 the drafters explained that ‘‘the clearing and settlement of payment
obligations among financial institutions are an essential element of the financial
system in Canada.” Federal jurisdiction with respect to them was assumed in the
name of ‘‘the national interest” and the role of the Bank of Canada ‘‘in
promoting the economic and financial welfare,” in order to achieve ‘‘the stability
of the financial system in Canada and the maintenance of efficient financial
markets,” as well as ‘‘in order to control risk to the financial system in Canada
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According to Hogg, supra note 28 at 15 49, specifically rejecting the ‘‘frozen concepts”
underlying the theory of ‘‘originalism” to the contrary, ‘‘the doctrine of progressive
interpretation is one of the means by which the Constitution Act, 1867 has been able to
adapt to changes . . .” at 15 48.
Reference re Same Sex Marriage (2004), 2004 CSC 79, 2004 SCC 79, 2004 CarswellNat
4422, 2004 CarswellNat 4423, REJB 2004 81254, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, 246 D.L.R. (4th)
193, 12 R.F.L. (6th) 153, 125 C.R.R. (2d) 122, 328 N.R. 1, [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 325,
[2004] S.C.J. No. 75 (S.C.C.) at para. 22. For this phrase see also text that follows note 29,
supra.
Supra note 164 at para. 202.
S.C. 1996, c. 6, Sch., Preamble.
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and contribute to its stability.” Needless to say, none of these is an express head
of federal legislative power under the Constitution Act.
Neither the original Canadian Payments Association Act171 nor its revised
version as the Canadian Payments Act172 has a Preamble. Having reviewed
background papers, Crawford173 concludes that the fundamental policies of
efficiency and safety served as the basis for those provisions of the Canadian
Payments Act dealing with payment systems that do not necessarily involve a
systemic risk to the Canadian financial system. In his opinion, federal
jurisdiction can be rationalized also with respect to such systems, since they
‘‘must be operated prudently and responsibly in order to maintain public
confidence in electronic payment systems.”174
He is also of the view175 that ‘‘[p]rotection of the payment system by the
reduction of risks created by participants’ insolvency appears . . . to be a
legitimate topic for federal legislation even if its provisions impinge somewhat on
. . . civil rights . . .” He goes on to assert that:
In the Preamble to the PCSA, the federal government seems to be
signalling its intention to lay claim to the right to legislate in the
national interest with respect to the payment clearing and settlement
systems of significance to the Canadian financial system, perhaps as an
exercise of its power over banking, perhaps in relation to insolvency, or
perhaps (in view of the express references to the national interest and
the national economy) under the residual ‘‘peace, order and good
government” power.176

A recent amendment to the PCSA expanding the power of the Governor of
the Bank of Canada to address ‘‘payment system risk” in clearing and settlement
systems confirms this approach.177 Subsequently, in a consultation document,178
the government of Canada pointed out that under Part 2 of the Canadian
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S.C. 1980 81 82 83, c. 40, s. 54.
S.C. 2001, c. 9, s. 218.
Bradley Crawford, The Law of Banking and Payment in Canada, vol. 1, looseleaf
(Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2008) at s. 7:50.30(1).
Ibid., s. 7:40.
Ibid., s. 7:50.30(2).
Ibid., s. 7:50.30(1).
PCSA, supra note 170, as amended 2014, c. 39, s. 362. ‘‘Payments system risk” is defined
in s. 2 to mean:the risk that a disruption to or a failure of a clearing and settlement system
could cause a significant adverse effect on economic activity in Canada by (a) impairing
the ability of individuals, businesses or government entities to make payments, or (b)
producing a general loss of confidence in the overall Canadian payments system, which
includes payment instruments, infrastructure, organizations, market arrangements and
legal frameworks that allow for the transfer of monetary value.
Department of Finance of Canada, Balancing Oversight and Innovation in the Ways We
Pay: A Consultation Paper (13 April 2015), online: <http://www.fin.gc.ca/activty/
consult/onps ssnp eng.asp> at 5.
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Payments Act179 the government ‘‘has responsibilities with respect to the
oversight and regulation of payment systems that are national or substantially
national in scope, or systems that play a major role in supporting transactions in
Canadian financial markets or the Canadian economy.” Arguably, it is along
these lines that even the earlier passage by Parliament of the Payment Card
Network Act180 can be rationalized. The latter authorizes regulations to
effectively address the contractual relationships between cardholders and card
issuers.181
For its part, the ‘‘orderly and uniform financial system for the Dominion” of
which Binavince and Fairley speak 182 is likely to include all financial
intermediaries, such as all those belonging to the historical ‘‘four pillars”:
namely, in addition to banks, also trust and loan companies, securities firms, and
insurance companies.183 Arguably, it is along these lines that Crawford explains
the indiscriminate application of the Prepaid Payment Products Regulations184 to
all federally regulated financial institutions as premised on ‘‘banking” being
viewed as a federally regulated activity, even as it is carried out by non-banks. 185
This is, however, only a limited breakaway from the institutional approach since,
as Crawford concedes, ‘‘extraordinarily extensive statutory authority” from ‘‘all
the federal financial institutions statutes” is invoked as the basis of these
regulations.186 Being limited to an activity carried out by federally regulated
financial institutions, this approach ought not to be taken as marking ‘‘the full
limits of [federal Parliament’s] power”187 in relation to ‘‘banking.”
So far, no power in relation to non-federally regulated financial
intermediaries has been claimed by the federal government.188 In any event,
179
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Supra note 172. Part 2 of the Act authorizes the Minister to designate a payment system
that is national or substantially national in scope, or that plays a major role in supporting
transactions in Canadian financial markets or the Canadian economy.
S.C. 2010, c. 12, s. 1834.
Particularly, see 6(d). Once in force, it gives effect to regulations ‘‘prescribing conditions
regarding the issuance of payment cards that a payment card network operator must
include in any agreement entered into with an issuer.”
Supra note 161 at 329, and accompanying text.
See e.g. Christopher C. Nicholls, Financial Institutions: The Regulatory Framework
(Canada: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) at 11.
S.O.R./2013 209.
Bradley Crawford, ‘‘The Prepaid Payment Products Regulation: The Feds are Coming”
(2014) 29 B.F.L.R. 549 at 551.
Ibid. at 550.
Per Laskin C.J.C. in Pioneer, supra note 156.
See e.g. W.D. Moull, E.J. Waizer & J. Ziegel, ‘‘The Changing Regulatory Environment
for Canadian Financial Institutions: Constitutional Aspects and Federal Provincial
Relations” in Jacob Ziegel, Leonard Waverman & David W. Conklin, Canadian
Financial Institutions: Changing the Regulatory Environment (Toronto: Ontario
Economic Council, 1985) at 101.
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even if it were claimed to the entire extent of the activity of financial
intermediation, this power is not broad enough to embrace those providers of
payment services that are not truly financial intermediaries, such as money
transmitters.
I therefore submit that the key to an expanded federal jurisdiction is inquiry
into the meaning of ‘‘banking” functionally, that is, by examining the activities of
which banking consists. Historically, the meaning of ‘‘banking” has not been
constant throughout the generations. Deposit banking, in the sense of accepting
deposits and lending them, goes back in Antiquity to both Greece 189 and
Rome.190 In Europe, it declined and ultimately became dormant towards the end
of the fifth century CE, when Antiquity came to end. ‘‘Banking” reappeared in
the first part of the second millennium and developed during the late Middle
Ages. However, ‘‘banking” in Medieval Europe covered both exchange and
deposit banking; these were separate businesses, generally speaking, carried out
by different persons. Exchange bankers were large merchants forming extensive
intercity networks. At the same time, deposit and transfer bankers emerged, as an
outgrowth of local money-change business, as of the late part of the 12th century.
They operated until the first part of the 16th century. During that period, they
accepted deposits, gave loans out of them, facilitated book transfers, and
sometimes provided chequing services. In the course of the 16th century, they
disappeared. To a large extent, their functions were taken over by public banks,
except that the latter were restricted in, if not precluded altogether from, making
loans and otherwise extending credit. Public banks continued to exist until the
end of the 18th century.191
According to De Roover, ‘‘[i]n all the manuals of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, a banker is defined as a dealer in bills of exchange who
189

190

191

See e.g. Raymond Bogaert, Banques et banquiers dans les cite´s grecques (Leyde: A.W.
Sijthoff, 1968) at 50 60 and 331 345; and E.E. Cohen, Athenian Economy and Society: A
Banking Perspective (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992) at 8 11, 14 18,
62 66, and 111 121.
See e.g. Jean Andreau, Banking and Business in the Roman World, trans. by Janet Lloyd
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 30 49. See also Dominic Rathbone &
P. Temin, ‘‘Financial Intermediation in First Century AD Rome and Eighteenth
Century England” in K. Verboven, K. Vandorpe & V. Chankowski, eds., Pistoi Dia Te`n
Techne`n
Bankers, Loans and Archives in the Ancient World: Studies in Honour of
Raymond Bogaert (Leuven: Peeters, 2008) at 371.
For Medieval banking, see e.g. Raymond Adrien De Roover, ‘‘Banking and Credit in the
Formation of Capitalism” (Paper presented at the Fifth International Conference of
Economic History Leningrad, 1970), (Paris, 1979) at 9; and in more detail, R. De Roover,
Money, Banking and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges: Italian Merchant Bankers, Lombards
and Money Changers: A Study in the Origins of Banking (Cambridge, Mass.: The
Mediaeval Academy of America, 1948), republished as vol. 2 of The Emergence of
International Business, 1200 1800 (London: Routledge/Thoemmes Press, 1999). For
public banks, see e.g. J.G. Van Dillen, ed., History of the Principal Public Banks (London:
Frank Cass, 1964), which is a reprint of the original 1934 edition (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1934).
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operates with correspondents abroad and speculates on the rates of
exchange.”192 For its part, modern commercial banking emerged as of the
18th century in England; it merged (i) a new way for dealing with bills of
exchange (i.e., discounting rather than participation in an exchange transaction),
(ii) a renewed practice of deposit-taking for lending as well as the provision of
chequing services (both paying and collecting them out of and into depositors’
current accounts), and (iii) a novel function, that of the issue of banknotes as
paper money. Over the years, modern commercial banking lost its bill of
exchange dealing and banknote issue functions.193 In 1914, Issacs J. in the High
Court of Australia said that:
[T]he essential characteristics of the business of banking . . . may be
described as the collection of money by receiving deposits upon loan,
repayable when and as expressly or impliedly agreed upon, and the
utilization of the money so collected by lending it again in such sums as
are required.194

In United Dominions Trust Ltd. v. Kirkwood (1966), Lord Denning MR
accepted this definition and further elaborated:
There are . . . two characteristics usually found in bankers today: (i)
they accept money from, and collect cheques for, their customers and
place them to their credit; (ii) They honour cheques or orders drawn on
them by their customers when presented for payment and debit the
customers accordingly. These two characteristics carry with them also a
third, namely: (iii) They keep current accounts, or something of that
nature, in their books in which the credits and debits are entered.195

This cumulative definition of the core of the ‘‘banking business” was
followed in Canada;196 it still holds true, albeit subject to modifications
recognizing the advent of electronic banking and the emergence of modern
payment methods other than the cheque.197 It is consistent with the perspective
of economists who view the core services of the modern commercial banker as
192
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See e.g. Raymond Adrien De Roover, ‘‘New Interpretations of the History of Banking”
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Chicago Press, 1974; Phoenix Edition, 1976) at 200, 229.
In general, see e.g. Richards, The Early History of Banking, supra note 35.
State Savings Bank of Victoria v. Permewan, Wright & Co. (1915), 19 C.L.R. 457 at 471.
[1966] 2 Q.B. 431 (Eng. C.A.) at 447.
It was cited with approval (as a matter of common law) by Beetz J. Pioneer, supra note
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consisting of deposit taking, lending, and providing payment facilities. 198 Indeed,
‘‘[t]o be recognized as a bank . . . an institution is expected to receive deposits of
money from its customers; to maintain current accounts for them; to provide
advances in the form of loans or overdrafts; and to manage payments on behalf
of its customers.”199
On its own, neither lending nor providing payment services is ‘‘banking.”
What makes institutions into ‘‘banks” in the broad common law and economic
sense is deposit-taking. Nevertheless, as a business, deposit-taking does not stand
on its own. ‘‘From an economic point of view the banking function may be
defined as the provision of services which facilitate the creation of bank deposits
(i.e., bank money). Bank services which do not aid in the provision of bank
deposits would be defined as non-banking services.”200 Indeed, on its own,
deposit-taking for mere safekeeping is expensive and hence inefficient.
The provision of payment services is ancillary to the basic banking function
of deposit-taking. Indeed, where both payer and payee have funds on deposit, it
is efficient to have the payer pay the payee by means of book entries to their
respective accounts. In turn, it is the availability of deposited funds for lending to
third parties that makes deposit-taking profitable to a depositary. Hence,
deposit-giving becomes cost-efficient to the depositor, to whom the depositary
will pass some of the profits, in the form of cost savings, with the view of
attracting more deposits. Thus, the evolution in Antiquity201 of mechanisms for
payments initiated by the issue of payment orders had been part and parcel of the
emergence of ‘‘banking” as a form of financial intermediation between
depositors to and borrowers from the depositary. Indeed, incentives for
keeping money with depositaries and using it for making payments to third
parties exist even where the depositary does not lend out of them in his own
name; historically, also a depositary who did not lend provided payment services.
Nevertheless, in the long run, the process of taking deposits, lending them, and
allowing them to be used by the depositors in payment to third parties turned the
depositary into a bank.202
While the bank deposit is typically entered into a running account to which
deposits and withdrawals are posted, its legal underpinning goes to Bretton v.
198
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Jonathan Law et al., eds., A Dictionary of Finance and Banking (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008) s.v. ‘‘bank”; Christopher T.S. Ragan & Richard G. Lipsey,
Economics, 12th ed. (Toronto: Pearson Addison Wesley, 2008) at 654; Stephen L. Slavin,
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(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1943) particularly at 3 25.
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Barnet (1598).203 This case dealt with the situation in which ‘‘[a] man delivers
money to J.S. to be redelivered to him when he should be required: which J.S.
refused.”204 The deliverer brought a debt action against J.S. Particular emphasis
was given to the distinction between ‘‘debt” and ‘‘detinue”; namely, between an
action for a sum of money and an action for the return of specific coins. 205
Explicitly citing a case holding that where ‘‘a man delivers money to another to
buy certain things for him, and he does not buy them, the party may bring an
action of debt . . .”,206 the Court held for the plaintiff. It is on this basis that, in
Foley v. Hill (1848), the House of Lords held that ‘‘a banker . . . receiving money
from his customer on condition of paying it back when asked . . .”207 ‘‘is a
debtor” to the customer.208 Hence, a single-purpose deposit for either safekeeping or payment to a third party is deposit-taking and hence subject to the
legislative power with respect to it. Furthermore, for the purpose of regulatory
powers, albeit not necessarily for all intents and purposes, even a prepayment for
goods and services to be acquired at the discretion of the payer from a single
retailer by means of a prepaid close-loop prepaid card is considered a ‘‘deposit.”
Viewing the scope of the federal legislative power in relation to ‘‘banking” as
premised on the meaning of the ‘‘banking business” or the function of ‘‘banking”
as deposit-taking is not a novel idea in the constitutional discourse in Canada. In
1964, the Porter Commission defined ‘‘banking liabilities” as ‘‘claims which serve
as means of payment or close substitutes for them.”209 Accordingly, it observed
that the ‘‘banking function is generally taken to include the issuing of claims
203
204
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(1598), 74 E.R. 918 Owen 86 (Eng. K.B.).
Ibid. Notwithstanding the ambiguity in this statement of facts, the report unequivocally
suggests (and so it was understood by Alfred William Brian Simpson, A History of the
Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1975) at 183) that the case dealt with the deposit of money for safekeeping, and not with a
demand loan. It is unlikely that a borrower’s debt liability would have been disputed in
1599.
The earliest writs for the recovery of a specific sum of money as well as a specific chattel
under the common law of England were modelled on the praecipe writs, namely the Writs
of Right for the recovery of land. Around the close of the 12th century, in Glanvill’s time,
they formed a composite writ originally encompassing debt and detinue. The ultimate
split occurred towards the end of the 13th century. Debt had come to provide for the
recovery of a specific sum of money. Detinue had come to provide for the recovery of
specific goods. See in general Stroud Francis Charles Milsom, Historical Foundations of
the Common Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) at 262 65; Cecil Herbert Stuart
Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law: Tort and Contract (London: Stevens &
Sons, 1949) at 25 28, 217 18. See also Theodore Frank Thomas Plucknett, A Concise
History of the Common Law, 5th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown: 1956) at 363 65. Recovery of
a specific amount of fungible (i.e., unascertained) goods fell under debt.
Cf. Core’s Case (1537), 1 Dy. 19, 73 E.R. 42 (Eng. K.B.); Fifoot, ibid. at 285.
(1848), 9 E.R. 1002, 2 H.L. Cas. 28 (U.K. H.L.) at 43 [H.L. Cas.], at 1008 [E.R.]. A
slightly earlier authority is Pott, Assignees of John Ryle, a Bankrupt v. Clegg, Executor of
William Turner, Deceased (1847), 153 E.R. 1212; 16 M. & W. 321.
Ibid. at 37 (H.L. Cas.), 1006 (E.R.).

PAYMENT LAW

39

which serve as means of payment or as close substitutes for such money
claims.”210 On this basis, the Commission specifically recommended that, in
principle, federal banking legislation ‘‘should encompass all financial institutions
issuing demand liabilities, transferable and short-term deposits, and other shortterm banking claims.”211
Certainly, however, the Porter Commission had in mind only ‘‘financial
intermediaries issuing claims which may be transferred immediately or on short
notice by cheques or on customers’ orders.”212 Its overall mandate was the
regulation of the financial system;213 while it addressed (in Chapter 11) sales
finance and consumer loan companies, it did not address money services
including money transmitters. However, the Porter Commission aimed at a
comprehensive ‘‘banking” regulation covering all deposit-taking financial
intermediaries. In this context, it cannot be faulted for overlooking money
transmitters. For certain, it is not proposed here to subject money transmitters
that are not financial intermediaries to the full extent of banking regulation.
Rather, the point stressed here is that, in the view of the Porter Commission, the
distinguishing feature or the core of the ‘‘banking function is generally taken to
include the issuing of claims which serve as means of payment or as close
substitutes for such money claims.”
It is then the taking of deposits which are used as a reservoir for non-cash
payments that is the distinctive feature of ‘‘banking,” setting it aside as a subject
for regulation. It is certainly up to the legislature or regulator to divide deposittakers into categories and subject them to varied degrees of regulation. Indeed, as
already mentioned in this Part, the post-Medieval public banks took deposits
that were not lent but nevertheless were used as a reservoir for non-cash
payments. Of course, in this day and age, it is absolutely legitimate to limit by
law the use of the word ‘‘bank” to a deposit-taker that is pretty much free to lend
and use deposited funds as it pleases. This is, however, not to deny that the
taking of deposits that are used as the reservoir for non-cash payments by other
institutions not legally called ‘‘banks” is nevertheless ‘‘banking” for the purpose
of the power to regulate them.
Indeed, in 1976, a federal White Paper specifically proposed that ‘‘a
Canadian Payments Association be established by companion legislation to the
Bank Act” and that ‘‘[a]ll institutions in Canada accepting deposits transferable
by order will be required to join the Association.”214 Effectively, the proposal
209
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Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1964)
at 378.
Ibid. at 377.
Ibid. at 363 [emphasis added].
Ibid. at 378 [emphasis added].
The Order in Council setting out its mandate is reproduced in ibid. at 569.
Canada, Department of Finance, White Paper on the Revision of Canadian Banking
Legislation (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1976).
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was to use the ‘‘banking” power to legislate with respect to ‘‘institutions
accepting deposits transferable by order,” namely, institutions accepting deposits
out of which funds are transferable by orders.215
Accordingly, in its original version, the Canadian Payments Association
Act216 limited membership to banks, the Bank of Canada,217 and any other
institution ‘‘that accepts deposits transferable by order to a third party.” 218 Its
successor, the Canadian Payments Act,219 went further, and did not specify this
requirement for new types of members such as life insurance companies and
securities dealers.220 With regard to them, it is therefore recognized that, even
without taking deposits and, in fact, without their payment activity relating to
their core function in financial intermediation, they are within the reach of the
federal ‘‘banking” legislative power as long as they provide payment services in
their ordinary course of business.221
Indeed, it is recognized that the debt owed by a paymaster222 to a payer need
not necessarily be on a ‘‘deposit” — no matter how far the latter is broadly taken
to mean. Moreover, in performing payment instructions, a paymaster may
extend credit to the payer, which is the case for a credit-card issuer. At the same
time, the typical relationship between the paymaster and payer is that of a debtor
and creditor on a ‘‘deposit.” While the provision of payment services is not
exclusive to banks or even deposit-takers, it is by nature a banking activity
derived and evolving from deposit-taking. At least it has a ‘‘rational, functional
connection” with the federal head of power223 of ‘‘banking.” As such, it falls
within the ambit of federal legislative power in Canada.
215

216
217
218
219
220

221

222

In fact, even this language is not strictly precise. In a funds transfer, one debt owed by a
bank to the payer extinguishes (or decreases), and allows for another debt that of a
bank to the payee
to arise (or increase) and substitute it substantially for the same
amount. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. (1987), [1989] 3 All E.R. 252,
[1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 259 at 269 [Lloyd’s Rep.], at 273 [All E.R.] (specifically
disapproving the dicta in Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d
1047 (2d Cir., 1979) at 1051, though without specifically identifying the case). See also R.
v. Preddy (John Crawford), [1996] A.C. 815 (U.K. H.L.) at 834. This principle is codified
with respect to the cheque (as a species of a bill of exchange) in BEA, supra note 31, s. 126.
Supra note 171.
Ibid., ss. 4(1)(a) (c).
Ibid., ss. 1 (definitions of ‘‘loan company” and ‘‘trust company”), 4(2), and 4(4).
Supra note 172.
Ibid., s. 4(d) (h), under which a life insurance company; a securities dealer; a cooperative
credit association; the trustee of a qualified trust; and a qualified corporation, on behalf
of its money market mutual fund, became eligible for membership.
For a similar extension of the federal ‘‘banking” legislative power to ‘‘banking” activities
of non banks, whether or not they are deposit takers, see Richard C. Owens & Neil
Guthrie, ‘‘‘Foreign Banks’ and the ‘Business of Banking’: Reforming Canada’s Foreign
Bank Access Regime for the Global Marketplace” (1998) 13 B.F.L.R. 343 at 359 360,
384 385.
For the paymaster and its role in a payment transaction, see Part 1, supra.
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5. IS THERE SCOPE FOR PROVINCIAL LAW?
Under section 92 of the Constitution Act,
In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation
to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter
enumerated; that is to say,
...
11. The Incorporation of Companies with Provincial Objects.
...
13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province.
. . . and
16. Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the
Province.

Subsections 11 and 16 appear to allow provinces to provide laws governing
strictly provincial and local payment systems. Thus, subject to being superseded
under the federal paramountcy doctrine, discussed further below, and if only on
historical grounds, I do not argue against the reading of subsection 11 as
allowing provinces to regulate PSPs, and even more in general, non-bank deposit
takers, albeit only, in each case, those ‘‘with Provincial Objects.” Powers under
subsections 11 and 16 do not permit a province to provide laws governing
payment systems with national scope. Conversely, subsection 13, covering
private law, provides a province with a potential inroad into payment laws.
Indeed, in its 2006 GGNPSD report, BIS endorsed the promotion of legal
certainty through the development of a transparent, comprehensive, and sound
legal framework for the payment system as a guideline for development of a
national payment system.224 In this context, the GGNPSD report went on to
explain that ‘‘[t]he legal framework for a national payment system is the body of
law which determines the rights and obligations of parties in the system.”225 It
specifically refers to the ‘‘legal framework” as involving both ‘‘law of general
applicability (such as property, contract, corporate and insolvency laws) that
affect the payment system, as well as those that are specific to it (such as payment
legislation, netting laws, and clearing house rules).”226 In principle, other than
when they specifically fall under a federal heading, such as in the case of
insolvency,227 ‘‘laws of general applicability” relate to ‘‘Property and Civil Rights
223
224
225
226

Papp v. Papp, supra note 80.
Supra note 6 at 5, 38 42 (Guideline 10) and 63 67 (Annex 4).
Ibid. at 38.
Ibid.
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in the Province” so as to be assigned to exclusive provincial jurisdiction under
section 92(13) of the Constitution Act.
Overlaps between the ‘‘Property and Civil Rights” provincial powers and
federal specific powers are inevitable. On this count, the federal legislative power
prevails by invoking one of two legal doctrines. First, interjurisdictional
immunity protects core federal competences from encroachment by provincial
legislation. The doctrine is rooted in the text of the Constitution Act, 1867, which
refers to ‘‘exclusivity” throughout sections 91 and 92.228 While now of ‘‘limited
application,” the doctrine remains fundamental to the division of powers and,
properly applied, ‘‘balances the need for intergovernmental flexibility with the
need for predictable results in areas of core federal authority.” 229 The doctrine
applies where the provincial law ‘‘trenches on the protected ‘core’ of a federal
competence” and its ‘‘effect on the exercise of the protected federal power is
sufficiently serious” so as to ‘‘impair . . . the federal exercise of the core
competence” in a way that ‘‘seriously or significantly trammels the federal
power.”230
Second, even as overlap of jurisdictions is recognized under the ‘‘double
aspect doctrine,”231 under what came to be known as ‘‘federal paramountcy,”
‘‘where there are inconsistent (or conflicting) [competent] federal and provincial
laws, it is the federal law which prevails.”232 Federal paramountcy may arise
from either the impossibility of dual compliance or the frustration of a federal
purpose (or its ‘‘intention”).233
I suppose that, in determining what constitutes ‘‘money” in Canada, the
intrinsic features of it, and any specific property rules relating to it,
interjurisdictional immunity protects the core federal power 234 in such
matters.235
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229
230
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In Canada, under s. 91(21) of the Constitution Act, supra note 15, the power to legislate in
relation to ‘‘Bankruptcy and Insolvency” is in Parliament’s hands.
Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 22, 2007 CarswellAlta 702, 2007
CarswellAlta 703, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, 409 A.R. 207, 75 Alta. L.R. (4th) 1, 49 C.C.L.I. (4th)
1, 281 D.L.R. (4th) 125, [2007] 8 W.W.R. 1, [2007] I.L.R. I 4622, 362 N.R. 111, 402
W.A.C. 207, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22 (S.C.C.) at para. 34, Laferrie`re c. Que´bec (Juge de la
Cour du Que´bec), 2010 SCC 39, 2010 CarswellQue 10212, 2010 CarswellQue 10213, (sub
nom. Québec (Procureur général) c. C.O.P.A.) [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536, (sub nom. Laferrière v.
Québec (Procureur Général)) 324 D.L.R. (4th) 692, 75 M.P.L.R. (4th) 113, (sub nom.
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Association) 407 N.R. 102,
[2010] S.C.J. No. 39 (S.C.C.) at paras. 25 61 [COPA].
COPA, ibid. at para. 58, Canadian Western Bank, ibid. at para. 77.
COPA, ibid. at paras. 27, 43, 45 (McLachlin C.J.’s emphasis).
Hodge v. Queen, The (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117 at 130.
See Hogg, supra note 28 at 16 2 to 16 3.
COPA, supra note 228 at para. 64.
See Part 1, above.
See B. Crawford, ‘‘Money in Constitutional Law: The Demise of Debtor Initiated
Payments?” (2015) 56 Can. Bus. L.J. 281.
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At the same time, arguably, at least as long as the federal government
chooses to be inactive on the point, and notwithstanding the ‘‘banking” exclusive
federal powers, provinces may pass, as a matter of property and civil rights, laws
governing rights of participants in a payment transaction. Looking for legislative
models elsewhere, both the German Civil Code236 and the Swiss Code of
Obligations237 treat payment instructions as a matter of ‘‘civil rights” other than
bills and cheques. More controversially, the Supreme Court of Canada recently
upheld provincial legislation addressing a banking transaction governed by
specific federal regulations. In the view of the court, the addition by the
provincial statute of disclosure requirements and sanctions for their violations
was a valid contractual norm as long as it did not contradict the requirements
and sanctions provided by federal law.238 Under such circumstances, when and
as intended, tight and clear drafting of the federal statute has to thrive for
exclusivity.
In Part 2(b) above, I argued for exclusive federal jurisdiction with respect to
bills and notes, including in wide-sense matters. However, in relation to
provincial legislative power, some complexity is introduced due to the strict- and
wide-sense dichotomy in what constitutes the law of bills and notes.239 As set out
below, there are three classes of situations where provincial law could apply to
what otherwise would have been ‘‘matters coming within bills and notes.”
The first class of matters in which provincial law applies is where a federal
statute governing bills and notes provides for the determination of certain
questions under general law, effectively that of each province. Arguably, this can
be done only in relation to wide-sense matters.240 For example, BEA section
46(1) provides that ‘‘[c]apacity to incur liability as a party to a bill is coextensive
with capacity to contract.” Another illustration is BEA section 52(1)(a) providing
that ‘‘[v]aluable consideration for a bill may be constituted by . . . any
consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.” As directed by the BEA,
capacity and consideration in relation to bills and notes are thus determined
under the general law of contracts in each province.241
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BGB §§783 792. Simon L. Goren, The German Civil Code, rev. ed. (Littleton, Colo.:
Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1994).
CO Articles 461 471 in Switzerland. For the Swiss Code of Obligations, see supra note 63.
Marcotte c. Banque de Montre´al, 2014 CSC 55, 2014 SCC 55, 2014 CarswellQue 9001,
2014 CarswellQue 9002, (sub nom. Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte) [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725, 25
B.L.R. (5th) 173, 374 D.L.R. (4th) 581, 462 N.R. 202 (S.C.C.), critically commented on
by Bradley Crawford, ‘‘Marcotte c. Banque de Montre´al: ‘Exclusive’ Federal Financial
Consumer Protection Law and the Role of the Law of Contract” (2015), 30 B.F.L.R. 345.
For both points with regard to exclusive federal jurisdiction and the wide versus strict
sense dichotomy in relation to ‘‘matters coming within bills and notes,” see Part 2(a).
This is so since, by definition, provinces are precluded from addressing ‘‘strict sense”
matters.
As for consideration, see Crawford, Banking and Payment, vol. 3, supra note 69, s. 27:30.
Note that the reference to the general law of the province (s. 52(1)(a)) is accompanied by a
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Second, the BEA has been construed to mean that subjects not provided for
by express provisions of a federal statute, insofar as they are not part of the law
of bills and notes in the strict sense, are governed by general provincial laws. 242
This is notwithstanding the language of section 9 of the Act, providing that ‘‘[t]he
rules of the common law of England, including the law merchant, save in so far
as they are inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, apply to bills,
notes and cheques.” It was held that ‘‘Section 9 of the BEA applies only to the
rules relating to bills [and notes] not covered by the BEA, not to the general
[supplementary] law.”243 This juxtaposition must be taken to mean that, as
opposed to supplementary law, ‘‘rules relating to bills, notes and cheques,” of
which BEA section 9 speaks, are only those relating to strict-sense matters. It was
accordingly decided that whether an endorser is discharged by the giving of time
by the holder to the maker after the maturity of the note is not a strict-sense
matter. Consequently, the point ought not to be explored through BEA section 9.
Rather, being a wide-sense matter, it is to be determined according to the general
law of the province governing rights of a surety.244
It is noteworthy that BEA section 9 speaks of ‘‘rules of . . . the law merchant”
as included in ‘‘[t]he rules of . . . the common law.” The former are said to be
‘‘usagess of merchants and traders,” including those already ‘‘ratified by the
decisions of Courts of law.”245 However, on the basis of recent research carried
out by Rogers246 and pursued by me,247 it may be pointed out that ‘‘the law
merchant” and ‘‘custom” were effective tools in the development of the common
law itself as it had been positioned to cover the bill of exchange. With the evergrowing expansion of commerce, more than true sources for normative rules,
‘‘law merchant” and ‘‘custom” were vocabulary, codes for a set of terms, or a
frame of reference, which allowed Common Law Courts to expand the frontiers
of liability with the view of satisfying the requirements and expectation of the
mercantile community. The alleged ‘‘reception”248 ‘‘was in reality nothing other
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specific common law rule: an antecedent debt or liability is consideration for a bill or note
(s. 52(1)(b)).
Crawford, Banking and Payment, ibid., s. 21:40.80(3).
Banque Toronto Dominion c. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Côte des Neiges, 2011
QCCA 1148, 2011 CarswellQue 5814, 2011 CarswellQue 11977, EYB 2011 191973 (C.A.
Que.) at note 1, per Dalphond J.A., who added that ‘‘this is all the more true since the
addition of sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, C. I 21, proclaiming
the duality of legal traditions.” However, in my view, the leap from common civil law
duality to federal
provincial duality is not well founded even in a case where the
particular federal law draws on the common law and the provincial one draws on the civil
law.
Guy v. Pare´, 1892 CarswellQue 324, 1 Que. S.C. 443 (Que. Ct. of Review).
Goodwin v. Robarts (1875), supra note 94.
James Steven Rogers, The Legal History of the Law of Bills and Notes (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 125 150.
Geva, The Payment Order, supra note 3 at 442 453.
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than a refinement of the common law which had always governed mercantile
affairs.”249
What then are ‘‘rules of . . . the common law” other than ‘‘rules of . . . the law
merchant,” which relate to strict-sense matters so as to be covered by BEA
section 9? Possibly they refer to rules that developed in the common law
specifically for bills and notes — albeit not during the post-Medieval formative
era. A tentative cut-off point may be the passage of the BEA in England. An
example of such a common law rule that prevails over any inconsistent or
conflicting provincial law may be the finality of payment with respect to payment
made by a drawee bank in ignorance of a forged drawer’s signature. Under
certain circumstances, such a bank may be denied a restitutionary remedy against
the bona fide recipient of the payment.250 Another example may be the scope of
the defence of non est factum (NEF) against a holder in due course.251
The third occasion for provincial law to apply is under the ‘‘double aspect
doctrine.”252 Under this doctrine, ‘‘subjects which in one aspect and for one
purpose fall within sect. 92 [of the Constitution Act], may in another aspect and
for another purpose fall within sect. 91.”253 In a context not involving bills and
notes it was held that ‘‘the federal jurisdiction over interest [under the
Constitution Act section 91(19)] does not exclude all provincial jurisdiction [in
relation to property and civil rights under Constitution Act section 92(13)] over
contracts involving the payment of interest.” Consequently, such federal
jurisdiction does not invalidate ‘‘provincial laws authorizing the Courts to
grant relief from such contracts, when they are adjudged to be harsh and
248
249
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For this alleged reception as the orthodox position, see Holdsworth, supra note 38 at 151.
John H. Baker, ‘‘The Law Merchant and the Common Law Before 1700” (1979) 38
Cambridge L.J. 295 at 322.
The rule of Price v. Neal (1762), 3 Burr. 1355, as was explained in National Westminster
Bank Ltd. v. Barclays Bank International Ltd. (1974), [1975] 2 W.L.R. 12 (Que. B.D.) and
in Barclays Bank Ltd. v. WJ Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd. (1979), [1980] 2 W.L.R.
218 (Que. B.D.) at 237. However, this explanation can be seen as given as a matter of BEA
statutory interpretation rather than a common law rule. In any event, this explanation
was overlooked in Canada, where the usual common law rule was held to protect an
innocent payee paid on a forged cheque who changed his position. See B.M.P. Global
Distribution Inc. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2009 SCC 15, 2009 CarswellBC 809, 2009
CarswellBC 810, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 504, 94 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, 58 B.L.R. (4th) 1, 304 D.L.R.
(4th) 292, [2009] 8 W.W.R. 428, 268 B.C.A.C. 1, 386 N.R. 296, 452 W.A.C. 1, [2009]
A.C.S. No. 15, [2009] S.C.J. No. 15 (S.C.C.).
Such a special rule was stated to exist in Carlisle & Cumberland Banking Co. v. Bragg
(1910), [1911] 1 K.B. 489 (Eng. C.A.). But see Lord Denning’s criticism in Gallie v. Lee,
[1969] 2 W.L.R. 901 at 910 (C.A.). The House of Lords (1970), [1971] A.C. 1004 (U.K.
H.L.) (sub nom. Saunders v. Anglia Bldg. Soc.) affirmed Lord Denning’s decision and
overruled Carlisle and Cumberland Banking Co. v. Bragg. It was nonetheless acknowl
edged by Lord Wilberforce that ‘‘special rules may apply” to negotiable instruments:
(1970), [1971] A.C. 1004 (U.K. H.L.) at 1027.
See Hogg, supra note 28, s. 15.5(c).
Hodge v. Queen, The (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117 at 130.
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unconscionable.”254 Accordingly, provincial jurisdiction over property and civil
rights extends to contracts involving bills and notes.
Nonetheless, having passed the test of validity, a provincial law could still be
defeated under the doctrine of ‘‘federal paramountcy.” Thereunder, ‘‘where there
are inconsistent (or conflicting) federal and provincial laws, it is the federal law
which prevails.”255 Thus, insofar as ‘‘matters coming within bills and notes” are
concerned, the express provisions of the federal BEA supersede any conflicting or
inconsistent, even if valid, provincial laws. For example, a province could
provide rules with respect to warranties on the transfer of property, could
establish as a general rule that no transferee could ever acquire more rights than
his or her transferor had, or could provide that the use of bills and notes in
certain situations is unconscionable. Such laws are valid and applicable to bills
and notes. They are, however, to be superseded in relation to bills and notes by
the express provisions of any federal statute, whether relating to the law of bills
and notes in the strict sense or, assuming federal jurisdiction as explained in Part
2(b) above, also in the wide sense. They are also to be superseded by uncodified
‘‘strict sense” rules relating to bills and notes. To pursue the previous examples,
section 137 of the BEA dealing with warranty by transferor (a matter that is part
of the law of bills and notes in the wide sense) would supersede the hypothetical
provincial statute governing warranties on the transfer of property. This is true
even if the latter purports to cover bills and notes specifically. By the same token,
the provisions of the BEA applicable to the right of a holder in due course (which
are part of the law of bills and notes in the strict sense) prevail over the
hypothetical provisions with respect to the transferee’s disabilities. As well, a
provincial statute could regulate the use of bills and notes; it cannot prevent a
bona fide purchaser for value of bills and notes issued (or not marked) in
violation of a provincial statute from becoming their holder in due course. 256
Federal paramountcy applies wherever federal and provincial laws, each
valid, are ‘‘incompatible.” The doctrine was held to exist even where ‘‘the
provincial legislature acts within its primary powers, and Parliament pursuant to
ancillary powers,”257 assuming, as discussed in Part 2(b) above, such powers
exist. Furthermore, the effect of the doctrine of federal paramountcy is not only
254
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Tomell Investments Ltd. v. East Markstock Lands Ltd. (1977), 1977 CarswellOnt 468,
1977 CarswellOnt 422, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 974, 77 D.L.R. (3d) 145, 2 R.P.R. 69, 16 N.R. 139
(S.C.C.) at 152 153 [D.L.R.], explaining the majority’s view in Ontario (Attorney
General) v. Barfried Enterprises Ltd., 1963 CarswellOnt 68, [1963] S.C.R. 570, 42 D.L.R.
(2d) 137 (S.C.C.).
Hogg, supra note 28 at ch. 16.
Duplain v. Cameron, 1961 CarswellSask 55, [1961] S.C.R. 693, 30 D.L.R. (2d) 348, 36
W.W.R. 490 (S.C.C.). Quaere whether provincial law is nonetheless relevant in defining
‘‘honesty” for the purpose of denying ‘‘good faith” (s. 3 of the BEA).
Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 22, 2007 CarswellAlta 702, 2007
CarswellAlta 703, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, 409 A.R. 207, 75 Alta. L.R. (4th) 1, 49 C.C.L.I. (4th)
1, 281 D.L.R. (4th) 125, [2007] 8 W.W.R. 1, [2007] I.L.R. I 4622, 362 N.R. 111, 402
W.A.C. 207, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22 (S.C.C.) at para. 69 [CWB].
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to assign precedence to federal statutes but also to entrench common law rules
that are part of the law of bills and notes in the strict sense. Such common law
rules prevail over valid provincial laws, even where the latter laws are embodied
in a provincial statute that purports to supersede the former rules. This aspect of
federal paramountcy is the result of the effectiveness given to the common law
rules relating to strict-sense aspects under BEA section 9 as discussed above.
Thus, as applied to bills and notes, a ‘‘strict sense” common law principle will
prevail over a valid provincial ‘‘wide sense” law — even statutory. 258
The preceding analysis is consistent with the leading authority on the
application of the doctrine of federal paramountcy in relation to bills and notes.
Thus, in Atlas Lumber Co. v. Winstanley (1940)259 the Supreme Court of Canada
reviewed a provincial statute providing that no action for the recovery of a
liquidated sum of money could be taken without the permit of a provincial
administrative body.260 The court held that the statute could not supersede261 the
holder’s right of action on a promissory note. Five members of the court relied
on (what is now) section 73 of the BEA either alone or together with (what are
now) sections 133, 134, and 135.262 They read the Act as conferring a right of
action on the holder of a bill or note and to override conflicting provincial
legislation. Davis J. declined to read (what is now) section 73 (setting out rights
and powers of a holder) as providing for the holder’s right of action and based
his decision on another ground.263 He correctly pointed out that the rule under
which ‘‘the holder of a bill” ‘‘may sue on the bill in his own name” per what is
now BEA section 73(a) only means that he is not liable to be defeated in an
action on the bill on the ground that the action has been brought by the wrong
party. Even if so, he overlooked the fact that the holder’s independent right of
258

259
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But see Ziegel & Denomme, supra note 104 at 20, stating that ‘‘the overriding federal
jurisdiction [in relation to bills and notes] does not preclude the provinces from
regulating aspects of negotiable instruments law under their property and civil rights
power so long as the provincial legislation does not conflict with the federal legislation”
[emphasis added]. This proposition overlooks the overriding effect of the uncodified
‘‘strict sense” rule.
(1940), 1940 CarswellAlta 59, [1941] S.C.R. 87, [1941] 1 D.L.R. 625 (S.C.C.).
Specifically, the Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, S.A. 1937, c. 9, s. 8 stated that ‘‘no action or
suit for the recovery of any money which is recoverable as a liquidated demand or debt in
respect to any claim enforceable by virtue of any rule of law or equity or by virtue of any
statute . . . shall be taken . . . by any person whomsoever against a resident debtor in any
case” unless the board constituted by the Act and appointed by the provincial
government issues a permit consenting thereto.
Characterizing the provincial statute as ‘‘ultra vires,” as repeatedly said in the judgment,
is nonetheless inaccurate.
These provisions (relied on in full or in part by Duff C.J., Kerwin, Rinfret, Hudson, and
Taschereau JJ.) address the rights and powers of a holder as well as damages recovered by
him upon dishonour.
He held that a provincial legislature cannot confer what is in fact a judicial authority
upon its own nominee to decide whether a suitor shall have access to the provincial
courts, at least in relation to a matter within the exclusive power of Parliament.
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action is a rule of the law of bills and notes in the strict sense. 264 In the final
analysis, far beyond merely providing for a defence to an action on a bill or note,
the provincial statute subjected an unconditional right to ‘‘sue” prescribed by
federal law to conditions and administrative discretion.
This analysis explains the result of Duplain v. Cameron (1962).265 The case
dealt with a provincial statute regulating the trade in securities. The statute
required the registration of securities traders. ‘‘Securities” were defined to include
certain promissory notes. The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada rejected
a constitutional challenge to the application of the statute to promissory notes.
Kerwin C.J.C. stressed the valid provincial purpose of the statute as well as the
fact that ‘‘there is nothing [in the provincial statute] to prevent the holder of a
promissory note . . . from suing upon the document.”266 Ritchie J. upheld the
constitutionality of the provincial statute inter alia because ‘‘none of [its
provisions] . . . has any effect on the form, content, validity or enforceability of
promissory notes or is otherwise concerned with the ‘law of bills and notes in the
strict sense.’”267 Nor was there any conflict with an express provision of the BEA.
At the same time, Locke J., who dissented, regarded the provincial statute as
inconsistent with the free negotiability of promissory notes. Apparently he
viewed the right ‘‘to negotiate . . . promissory notes freely in the conduct of . . .
business”268 as a principle of law that as part of the law of bills and notes in the
strict sense prevails over the restrictions of the inconsistent provincial statute
even when it is not codified.
In McGillis v. Sullivan (1947),269 the Ontario Court of Appeal discussed a
provision of a provincial Gaming Act270 dealing with illegal consideration for a
bill or note. The provision conferred on the loser of a wager a right to recover
money, or some other valuable thing, paid or delivered to the winner.
Recognizing that ‘‘[t]he worth and adequacy of money, or other valuable
thing, as consideration for a note or bill falls within the provisions of the
264
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In the 1878 edition of his book on the law of bills of exchange, Chalmers (who does not
distinguish between the law merchant and common law rules relating to bills and notes)
defined ‘‘holder” as ‘‘the person in possession of a bill, who by the Law Merchant is
entitled to enforce the payment thereof” (Mackenzie D. Chalmers, A Digest of the Law of
Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes and Cheques, (London: Stevens and Sons, 1878) at
3). Cf. David A.L. Smout, ed., Chalmers on Bills of Exchange, 13th ed. (London: Stevens
& Sons, 1964) at 8, referring to the holder as ‘‘the mercantile owner of the instrument.”
Supra note 256.
Ibid. at 354. Taschereau, Fauteux, and Judson JJ. concurred. See also the decision of
Cartwright J.
Ibid. at 366.
Ibid. at 357.
1947 CarswellOnt 70, [1947] O.R. 650, 89 C.C.C. 286, [1947] 4 D.L.R. 113 (Ont. C.A.);
affirmed on other grounds 1949 CarswellOnt 112, [1949] S.C.R. 201, 93 C.C.C. 175,
[1949] 2 D.L.R. 305 (S.C.C.).
R.S.O. 1937, c. 297.
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[contested] section,” Laidlaw J.A. nevertheless thought that ‘‘the section is not in
substance legislation as to bills of exchange and promissory notes” and upheld its
validity.271
In the course of his judgment, Laidlaw J.A. pointed out that the provincial
legislation neither prevented nor prohibited the use of bills or notes given for
gambling debts and did not destroy their value in the hands of persons other than
the winner of money or other valuable thing described in the enactment. He went
on to explain that the section under attack dealt only with the rights and
relationship between the loser and the winner in a gaming transaction and did
not extend to third persons. While affecting bills and notes, insofar as it did not
infringe upon the federal legislation dealing with holders in due course, the
section was not in substance legislation as to bills of exchange and promissory
notes. Rather, the ‘‘pith and substance” of the legislation was a matter of
property and civil rights within the competency of the province.
Relying on McGillis, the Manitoba Court of Appeal upheld in Red River
Forest Products Inc. v. Ferguson272 the constitutionality of provisions of a
Gambling Act273 applicable in the province.274 The provincial statutory provision
deemed a promissory note issued for a gambling debt to be given for illegal
consideration. An endorsee not meeting the holding in due course
requirements275 was thus prevented from enforcing the note against the loser
who signed it.276
Had pertaining provincial legislation in both McGillis and Red River Forest
characterized gambling debt as illegal consideration generally, there would have
been no doubt as to its constitutional validity. Such legislation would have
affected indirectly liability on a bill or note given for the debt. This is so since, in
principle, other than as against a holder in due course, defences available under
provincial law in an action on a debt may also be raised in an action on the bill or
note given for the debt.277 However, in both cases the provincial legislation
purported to deal directly with a gambling debt as illegal consideration for a
‘‘bill” or ‘‘note.”
Nevertheless, the result in both cases, upholding provincial legislation
directly applicable to bills and notes, may be explained on three grounds. First,
the specific provincial reference to bills and notes must have been made in the
271
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McGillis, supra note 262 at para. 32.
(1992), 1992 CarswellMan 149, 8 C.P.C. (3d) 328n, 98 D.L.R. (4th) 697, [1993] 2 W.W.R.
1, 83 Man. R. (2d) 27, 36 W.A.C. 27, [1992] M.J. No. 556 (Man. C.A.).
Gambling Act (U.K.), 5 & 6 Will. IV, c. 41 (U.K.).
Court of Queen’s Bench Act, S.M. 1874 c. 12 (38 Vic., c. 12).
Set out in BEA, supra note 31, s. 55.
Among other sources, the judgment cites my earlier article on the subject, Benjamin
Geva, ‘‘Preservation of Consumer Defences: Statutes and Jurisdiction” (1982) 32
U.T.L.J. 176.
As indicated in Part 2(a), above, freedom from adverse claims to an instrument as well as
from prior party’s defences is reserved to a holder in due course (BEA, s. 73(b)).
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context of rendering gambling debts illegal generally. Second, as discussed, what
is ‘‘[v]aluable consideration for a bill [which under BEA section 52(1)(a)] may be
constituted by . . . any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract” is
determined under provincial law. Although illegality of consideration is not
specifically mentioned, it is not all that remote to consider it as excluded from
valid ‘‘valuable consideration” — as determined by provincial law — and
required to support liability on a bill or note. Third, one could perhaps go further
and conclude that even provincial legislation that relates specifically and
exclusively to bills and notes is good law, as long as it addresses ‘‘wide sense”
matters as applied to bills and notes — and is not inconsistent with both a federal
statute relating to bills and notes and an uncodified ‘‘strict sense” principle.
Arguably, the third ground is the most appealing. Accordingly, for
provincial legislation to be valid, two conditions must be met. First, the
provincial statute should not affect a ‘‘strict sense” matter. Second, the statute
ought not to be contrary to a specific valid federal provision, even where the
latter addresses a ‘‘wide sense” subject. As a matter of ‘‘property and civil
rights,” provincial legislation meeting these two conditions is thus valid, even if it
specifically addresses property and contract law aspects of bills and notes. A
good example is section 19(2)(2) of the Ontario Execution Act278 dealing with the
seizure of a negotiable instrument on behalf of an execution creditor.
Nevertheless, a few hard cases are not easily reconcilable. Thus, limitation of
time for actions on promissory notes was held to be within provincial legislative
authority.279 Similarly, provincial ‘‘seize or sue” legislation precluding a secured
party who repossessed the collateral from recovering on a debt instrument
including a bill or note was held to apply to an action on a bill or note. 280 Indeed,
in general, both the limitation of actions and creditors’ rights fall under
provincial jurisdiction as ‘‘property and civil rights” matters. At the same time,
as in Atlas Lumber,281 in relation to bills and notes, such legislation results in
curtailing the holder’s right to sue. As such, it seems unavoidable to conclude
that it ‘‘trespasses” into a strict-sense matter. Distinction based, for example, on
an alleged procedural nature of a statute of limitations is not persuasive
anymore.282
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Execution Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E 24.
See e.g. Weingarden v. Moss, 1955 CarswellMan 30, [1955] 4 D.L.R. 63, 15 W.W.R. 481,
63 Man. R. 243 at 253 (Man. C.A.) at para. 31, per Coyne J.A., citing with approval
Maclaren on Bills, Notes and Cheques, 6th ed., at 17.
For a comprehensive discussion, see e.g. J. Watson Hamilton, ‘‘When Is a Promissory
Note a Covenant to Pay under a Mortgage on Land?” (1996 97) 12 B.F.L.R. 221 at 233
247.
Supra note 259.
For the modern view under which the operation of a statute of limitation is a question of
substantive law not only under the civil law but also in the common law, see the judgment
of LaForest J. in Tolofson v. Jensen (1994), 1994 CarswellBC 1, 1994 CarswellBC 2578,
EYB 1994 67135, (sub nom. Lucas (Litigation Guardian of) v. Gagnon) [1994] 3 S.C.R.
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Crawford is of the view that, in principle, a provincial statute may not fasten
a limitation period on a holder of a bill or note.283 Nor can a provincial statute
deny from the holder the right to sue the debtor for the deficiency after
repossession.284 Accordingly, in his view, cases to the contrary were wrongly
decided. It is hard to argue against the logic of this position. Certainly I do not
question the existence of a federal legislative power in matters of (i) limitation
period for an action on a bill or note as well as (ii) enforcement of collateral given
to secure an obligation on a bill or note. However, it is unlikely that Parliament,
in refraining from providing, e.g., for a limitation period for bills and notes,
meant to exempt the holder from the application of general legislation on
limitations of action. At the same time, to suggest that provincial legislation
covering limitation of time for an action on a bill or note is binding as long as
Parliament has not dealt with the subject285 is to bring in the ‘‘double aspect”
doctrine, which per Atlas Lumber has no room for in a strict-sense matter.
Undoubtedly, it is within the power of a province to legislate as to debts paid
by means of a bill or note. As a matter of property and civil rights a province
may thus restrict the enforcement of an action on a debt or extinguish the debt
altogether. The issue as to the effect of such a restriction or extinguishment on
the bill or note with which this debt is paid becomes then a question to be
determined by the law of bills and notes in the strict sense. 286 While there is no
ready-made answer to the question, the chance is that a defence based on a
restriction on the action on or extinction of the underlying debt will be effective
against the holder’s action on the bill or note with which the debt has been paid,
albeit probably not where he is a holder in due course.287
Furthermore, arguably, even cases upholding the application of statues of
limitations as well as ‘‘seize or sue” provisions directly to bills and notes (and not
only to the debt paid by them) may be ‘‘saved.” This can be done by pointing out
that the holder’s right to sue, being a codified principle of the law of bills and
notes in the strict sense, is nonetheless not meant, even under the law of bills and
notes in the strict sense, to be absolute. Accordingly, provincial law barring the
holder’s action on grounds that are contrary to neither federal statute nor a
principle under the law of bills and notes in a strict sense is valid. Thus, there is
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1022, 100 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 26 C.C.L.I. (2d) 1, 22 C.C.L.T. (2d) 173, 32 C.P.C. (3d) 141,
120 D.L.R. (4th) 289, 7 M.V.R. (3d) 202, [1995] 1 W.W.R. 609, 51 B.C.A.C. 241, 175
N.R. 161, 77 O.A.C. 81, 84 W.A.C. 241, [1994] S.C.J. No. 110 (S.C.C.) at 319 [D.L.R.].
Crawford, Banking and Payment, vol. 3, supra note 69, s. 28:110.30.
Ibid., s. 20:30.20(3)(b).
As was suggested in Wiengarden, supra note 279.
A debt paid by a bill or note is presumed to be suspended until discharge or dishonour.
Charge Card Services Ltd (No.2), Re, [1988] 3 All E.R. 702 (Eng. C.A.). This, however,
does not tell as to the effect of a statutory restriction on, or extinction of, the debt.
A holder in due course may not be immune from defences that are based on the nullity of
the debt paid by means of the instrument on which he is suing. See e.g. Gallie v. Lee, [1969]
2 Ch. 17 (Eng. C.A.); affirmed (1970), [1971] A.C. 1004 (U.K. H.L.).
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nothing in the BEA nor otherwise in the law of bills and notes in the strict sense
to say that the holder’s enforcement right exists notwithstanding a limitation
period or the seizure of the collateral that secures the obligation on the bill or
note. Conversely, the grounds of forfeiting the holder’s right according to the
Alberta statute dealt with in Atlas Lumber288 were objectionable as a matter of
the law of bills and notes in the strict sense. Hence, (what is now) BEA section
73(a) ought to be read as superseding it. For certain, this reasoning narrows
down the scope of Atlas Lumber, and yet facilitates greater harmony between
provincial and federal laws.

6. CONCLUSION
Arguably, albeit as a matter of progressive interpretation, the bills and notes
federal legislative power under section 91(18) of the Constitution Act may be
stretched to encompass all payment instructions and not only those given on bills
or cheques. In any event, the operation of the non-cash payment system is
premised on, even if not limited to, inter-deposit bank transfers. Hence, it is
argued in this article, the federal legislative power over the entire payments area
draws primarily on the ‘‘banking” power of section 91(15) of the Constitution
Act.
Provinces may use their powers under the Constitution Act sections 92(11),
(13), and (15) in relation to the incorporation of companies with provincial
objects, property and civil rights, and matters of a merely local or private nature.
However, once such matters become part of a national payment system,
inconsistent provincial laws will be superseded by competent federal legislation.
Efficiency and legal certainty will be promoted by a uniform legal
framework. This does not mean that money transmitters ought to be regulated
as heavily as banks289 or that retail payment systems are to be subject to the same
treatment as wholesale/large-value systems.290 Rather, regulation of each such
category in Canada ought to be uniform. For sure, a strong case can be made for
federal regulation of all national institutions and activities. Indeed, as for rights
of participants in a payment transaction, a uniform provincial statute, passed
under the property and civil rights power, may not be ruled out as an option.
However, taking into account existing federal exclusive powers on matters such
as currency, bills and notes, and banking, and hence the federal government’s
overall leading position in the regulation of the national financial system, the
federal avenue for comprehensive regulation and legislation of payment methods
and systems is the most promising.
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Supra note 259.
For a possible regulatory approach, see e.g. Preamble (11) to Directive 2007/64/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in
the internal market O.J., L 319/1, 5.12.2007.
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